AAWSAP DIRD, State of the Art and Evolution of High-Energy Lasers, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office and dated 31 March 2010. It was produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It reviews chemical, solid-state, fiber, ultra-short pulse and free-electron lasers, as well as beam control, atmospheric propagation, DoD laser history and how spacecraft could be damaged by lasers. It projects that electrically powered lasers could enable MW-class weapons and spacecraft laser weapons within 20 years. It ends with shielding recommendations for spacecraft.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/31/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD surveys the development of high-energy laser weapons and notes that, although lasers had already become important military tools for ranging, guidance, and other lower-power uses, true weapon-class systems remained limited by power generation, beam control, atmospheric propagation, and logistics. The report reviews major laser types along with the optical, tracking, and thermal-management systems needed to make them militarily useful. It argues that high-energy lasers can offer important advantages over kinetic weapons in speed, precision, and low collateral damage, especially against softer or fast-moving targets, while also emphasizing that practical deployment has long been hindered by hazardous chemical fuels, thermal blooming in the atmosphere, power-supply constraints for mobile systems, and waste-heat removal.

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Table 1: Laser Systems lrradiance Calculations
Spot
Range Laser Power Area lrradiance
(km) (MW) (cmA2) (kW/cmA2)
1000 10 50000 0.1
350 10 500 1
350 1 50000 0.1
100 1 500 1
100 0.1 500 0.1
35 0.1 50 1
10 0.1 5 10
These irradiance levels show what could be delivered with laser powers from 100 kW to
10 MW at ranges from 10 to 1,000 km. Th is spans a wide range of realistic powers and
potentia l engagement ranges. The effectiveness of these irradiances against candidate
spacecraft designs will need to be determ ined through analyses and experiments.
Recommendations
If there are concerns about the potential vulnerability of future spacecraft to laser
radiation, then the following recommendations are offered:
• Optical components, such as horizon sensors, should have their telescopes baffled
and shielded to preclude the entrance of off-axis scattered light. Front shutters can
be installed and kept closed when the sensor is not in use or if excess optical energy
is detected.
• Antennas should be made with maximum reflectivity to UV, visible and near IR
wavelengths. They should also have as much thermal mass as possible. Coax
cables and power lines should be inside shields.
• Solar cells are more difficult to protect although some types are more tolerant of
laser radiation and thermal overload than others. They should be wired such that a
short or open in one area does not disable others. Cables should be shielded.
• Windows should have covers and potentially be coated to reflect laser wavelengths
of concern. Shutters that close automatically if laser radiation is detected might
also be useful.
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