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This Defense Intelligence Agency reference document is dated 30 March 2010. The Defense Warning Office prepared it under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It compares lone maverick inventors with corporate inventors who work in think tanks and other large organizations, focusing on unconventional energy and propulsion, including antigravity. It sorts inventors into five types. It concludes that formally trained mavericks (Types 3 and 4) are the most likely source of the next innovations. Untrained inventors are expected to contribute nothing substantial.
From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/30/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD compares lone “maverick” inventors with researchers working inside larger organizations in order to ask where major future breakthroughs are most likely to come from, especially in unconventional energy and propulsion. It concludes that the strongest candidates are technically trained, relatively independent, and flexible researchers working with some freedom from institutional constraint. Because that preferred profile closely resembles the kind of researcher who appears to have authored or shaped much of the broader AAWSAP DIRD effort, the document reflects a notable methodological circularity, validating the program’s operational model rather than neutrally assessing the innovation ecosystem.
UNCLASSIFIED! /FOR OfifilQlalik wse 8HL'I a technology. Also, they are not generally plagued by the insecurities of the Type 1 inventor about subjecting their inventions to outside scrutiny, and some will be bold enough to publish in respected scientific journals (Reference 23). This means they keep better lab notes than Type 1 inventors. It does not mean they are intrinsically better scientists or inventors. Type 2 inventors generally have a bit more training in physics and sometimes start with a theory of which they request analysis from a local university professor, for example. Usually the theory is either partially formed or is not directly relevant to the proposed invention. The professor dutifully examines the theory presented while not being informed of the overall us,e to which his work is to be put and makes a pronouncement that the inventor can usually twist one way or another to suit his future fundraising efforts (Reference 24). Often the inventor has access to various theories about energy or gravity that are posted in non-peer-reviewed media and uses these to initiat e or justify the proposed invention. Type 2 inventors have a generally greater success at securing a patent, as they have a better basis on which to make a claim and can afford better patent lawyers. Some of the more advanced Type 2 inventors realize they need to start with a more pure physics experimental approach rather than going straight for the applied invention, although these are rare (Reference 23). Once the initial concept has proved infeasible on the bench, these inventors can burn through a large amount of additional money in a scatter-shot approach, trying to save face and what little money is left. Some will continually scan the Internet or underground press for other likely energy candidates to switch allegiance to (Reference 14, 15), or will simply convince other gullible investors to continue to prop up the technology with ever-more contorted descriptions of what is needed to succeed. Eventually the house of cards collapses, and all the players go home, licking their financial and psychological wounds. This occurs when an investor finally starts asking the tough technical and measurement questions that should have been addressed at the outset. What can be learned from the Type 2 inventor? On the one hand, these inventors can be much more dangerous than Type 1 inventors, as they can use their enhanced financial clout to make it appear as if they have something of value and thereby attract capital that might otherwise be used in more fruitful pursuits. On the other hand, Type 2 inventors can serve a useful purpose in showing others where not to tread. Their ability to instantiate some degree of professional sophistication - for example, university professor-marginally increases the likelihood of a true innovation. However, the personality of the Type 2 inventor will dictate their receptiveness to external advice. The Type 3 Inventor As the inventor gains more formal training, the foundation for the innovations tends to be a hypothesis or mathematical model leading to basic experiments, as opposed to starting with a full -blown embodiment of the hoped- for invention . In the best case, this is a staged approach in which the inventor already has sufficient knowledge about the area to know how to design a succession of experiments and interpret the results properly to make increasingly accurate assessments of the likely validity of the invention. Optimally, the hypothesis is based on an extension of known physical laws UNCLASSIFIED/ ffiOR OFifilCIOL 11ili ONI X 8
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 19 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.