AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

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Appendix D: Landing Ellipses for Hypersonic Gliders
Figure 14 graphically shows the cross (lateral) range and down range for various
hypersonic gliders. The lateral range and down range describe a landing ellipse for a
vehicle entering the glide at 22,400 feet/second as shown in Figure 46 . The 0,0 point is
the beginning of the entry or glide trajectory .
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Model 176B
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
IAtmospheric Down Rang 1000 nautical miles
Entry
Figure 46. Landing Ellipses for {from left) Apollo Capsule, NASA Ames M2/F2, USAF X-20 DynaSoar,
FDL Lifting-Body, 88%-Capability MDC Model 176H, and MDC 176H
The space shuttle landing ell ipse would be inside the DynaSoar (X -20) ellipse, as its
cross range is one missed orbit, or 1,555 nautical miles. The down range would be
approximately 9,800 nautical miles. The ellipse is offset from 0,0 and has an
indentation into some of the landing el lipse. This is an area the glider cannot reach
with the aerodynamic and structural lim its. The ballistic example is for the Apoll o
capsule, which had an L/D of about 0.5; Gemini and Mercury ellipses would be smaller.
The Model 176B or Model 176H using 88 percent of its glide capability would have a
glide range equal to the Earth's equatorial circumference.
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