AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

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Appendix C: TAV Operational Costs
Art Robinson was the deputy program manager for the MDC Manned Aerospace Vehicle
Group at MDC Astronautics, Huntington Beach. Working with Art, the St. Louis part of
the team prepared a work breakdown structure for servicing and maintaining an Air
Force transatmospheric vehicle (TAV) based on a B-52 squadron. Larry Fogel of
Decision Sciences visited several B-52 bases and discussed the operational concept and
repair/maintenance work structure with the B-52 crews and maintenance personnel.
The result was an estimate of the costs for operating a squadron of TAVs that had the
same flight frequency as the B-52 squadron. The result for the one-and-a-half-stage
TAV is shown in Figure 45. As might be expected, orbital operations are substantially
more costly than atmospheric operations (aerodynamic cruise of hypersonic long-range
glide). With an operational range greater than a refueled B-52, the TAV has a lower
cost than the once-refueled B-52. The orbital cannot be compared directly with a B-52
since in achieving orbit the TAV has essentially infinite cruise range and duration limited
only by the crew. The concept of operations was essentially that shown in Figure 37
installed on a U.S. Air Force SAC base. Although the SAC flight crews concentrated on
potential nuclear missions, the presentation focused on a wide spectrum of kinetic
penetrators installed in a rocket-accelerated entry nose cone. The terminal speed of
the entry nose cone was in the 12,000 to 14,000 feet/second range. At that speed the
energy delivered per unit weight was much greater than a spherical charge of HBX-6
because the kinetic energy was directly delivered to the target. The weapons spectrum
could address a very wide range of targets that could be disabled or made
nonfunctional or be destroyed with minimal collateral damage.
Cost $97,000,000 tmospheric Cmise
$251,000,000 Orbital Cost $71,000,000 B-52 only*
140 000,000 Refueled B-52
Larry Fogel
Decision Sciences
*annual costs per DAA (14 vehicles) Titan Corporation
Spring 1984
Figure 45. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics (Huntington Beach)-Funded Study of TAV Operational Costs
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