Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
“Lockheed”5 pages
UNCLASSIFIED/ fFOR OFFICIO I.. Pili ODIi..¥ Appendix B: Aeropropulsion Integrated Vehicle A launcher that uses air-breathing propulsion in a portion of its flight to exit the atmosphere has the same entry issues as the rocket-boosted hypersonic glider. However, the capture of atmospheric air to create thrust by chemical combustion is a different issue, as it configures the underside (aerodynamic compression side) as a propulsion system that produces more thrust than drag and also produces lift. For the propulsion system to function efficiently, the dynamic pressure and air mass flow per unit area must be higher than a rocket exit trajectory, as it is the airflow mass that enables the propulsion system to produce thrust in excess of drag so the vehicle can accelerate . So in this case we have a propulsion-configured vehicle. Neither the shape of the vehicle nor the trajectory it flies is arbitrary. The air breather does not exit the atmosphere as quickly as the rocket but stays in the atmosphere to the point where the transition to rocket propulsion occurs-usually set when the air-breather propellant per unit change in velocity is equal to or greater than the rocket propulsion, usually at about mach 12 to 14. The air-breathing propulsion system mechanical, aerodynamic, and thermal loads act longer and are of greater magnitude than the rocket-powered vehicle. In fact, the dynamic pressure-that is, the pressure of the air impacting the vehicle- is about 10 times greater than the entry dynamic pressure of the hypersonic glider. In this case the principal thermal load is encountered during exit from the atmosphere and the vehicle must be configured to generate sufficient thrust to provide a strong acceleration. So an air-breather configuration is different from the hyperson ic glider, because the hypersonic glider has not been configured to fly extensively in the atmosphere and produce thrust from captured airflow. Like the hypersonic glider, this vehicle needs the same glide performance at entry. However, with the thermal protection designed by the high exit loads, the entry design is one of detail in maintaining stability and control and of achieving a comparable glide L/D ratio. The carried oxidizer is heavy and requires more engine thrust to lift it into space. A hydrogen/oxygen rocket, vertical-launch vehicle with a 7,000-kg payload has a gross weight in the 450,000- to 500,000-kg range and a 50,000-kg operational weight empty (that is, with the payload loaded). The eng ine thrust for a vertical takeoff is about 607,000 to 820,000 kg. A modest-performance combined-cycle air breather with a 7,000-kg payload and a 50,000-kg operational we ight empty has a gross weight in the 200,000- to 225,000-kg range. The engine thrust for a vertical takeoff is about 270,000 to 304,000 kg. Most of the gross weight reduction is from the lesser amount of oxidizer carried and the lighter propu lsion system weight. UNCLASSIFIED/ fFOA OFFICIO! 1155 AN! X 46
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.