Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
“Lockheed”5 pages
UNCLASSIFIED//POlt OPPIEIJct t:191!!! BHL'f payload would be 15,228 lb-well within the payload capacity. The operating parameters for the station were a nominal 21-person crew with provisions for up to 27. This study determined that 47,000 lb (21,315 kg) of resources were required per crewmember per year. So for 1 year and a 21-person complement, 448 metric tons of supplies would need to be lifted to the station for crew support, not counting propellants to maintain the station orbit. With 21 crewmembers, 4 flights per year would be required to meet the 6-month assignment requirement. To lift the crew supplies to the station would require 64 flights per year, not counting propellant- and hardware-replacement missions, which might require another 5 to 6 flights per year. The minimum number of flights to a large station would be 74 flights per year. From a military mission analysis, that would require a fleet of 10 aircraft (without operational spares) flying 7 times a year for 15 years and a 100-flight operational life. The spacecraft and systems considered in the study were: • Ballistic, derivative Apollo capsule, Rockwell. • HL-10 lifting body, NASA Langley. • Wing body, X-20 derivative, Boeing. • Variable-geometry lifting body, Model 176, McDonnell Douglas. • Operations and logistics requirements, Lockheed, NAS-9-1422. • Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Lockheed, NAS-9-1688. • Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory (MORL), McDonnell Douglas, NAS-1-362. This summary report contained a large number of recommendations and conclusions. Those that were pertinent to the Saturn 1B and Saturn V rocket launchers and the rotating space station are not listed. Only those related to the vehicle and propulsion system are given. • Among the lifting-body spacecraft, the variable-geometry spacecraft provides the best combination of hypersonic maneuvering and landing performance. • A 9- to 12-passenger payload with equipment is recommended. • An abort system for both low-altitude and high-altitude abort and escape is required. • Structural concepts and materials applicable to the loads and heating of lifting spacecraft are within the present (that is, 1965) state of the art. • The weight factor for lifting spacecraft results primarily from a larger surface area and only secondarily from the associated spacecraft environment. • Radiation-cooled structures are generally lighter than other structural concepts. • For surface temperatures above 2,200 °F (1,204 °C), refractory metals are required, and coating life is the major refractory metal limitation (applies to carbon-carbon today). UNCLASSIFIED,';'FOA OFFI&il.t.k W&li &rtllf 44
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.