Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
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Table 2. Elements of the Space Infrastructure Shown in Figure 44
Orbital System Function Orbit
L Sustained Use Launcher High frequency , modest
payloads LEO/MEO
2 Expendable Launcher Low frequency, heavy
payloads LEO
3 Point-to-Point Transfer Points on Earth or orbit
4 Operations Center/Space
Station
Operations
Coordination/Research LEO/MEO
5 Orbital Servicing Vehicle Maintains in-orbit vehicles All
6 Fuel Station Spaceport Refuels orb ital vehicles LEO
7 Spacebased Manufacturing Human based low "g"
manufacturing LEO
8 Man-Tended
Manufacturing
Robot based micro "g"
manufacturing LEO/GEO
9 Orbital Sweep Vehicle Orbital clean-up vehicle All
LO Waste Storage and
Processing Vehicles
Processes & disposes human
and manufacturing wastes HEO
LI Navigation/Weather Supports travel network LEO/MEO
12 Orbital Mapping Vehicl Measures resources &
geography LEO/MEO
L3 Space Based Warning Military and Asteroid
warning HEO/GEO
L4 Spacebased Hotel Space tourist facilities LEO/MO
15 SpaceCruiser vehicle Human Transport and
Rescue LEO
16 Communication Satellite
Constellations
Supports telecommunication
systems All
L7 Orbital Transfer Vehicle Orbital Altitude/Plane
Change All
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41 Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.