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AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

U.S. Department of War · 2010-03-08 · 56 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

  • p. 5 …much the issue, as exemplified by the Lockheed A-12/SR-71. When asked about space…
  • p. 12 …the AFFDL at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC), and the Lockheed…
  • p. 20 …This was similar to the Lockheed Star Clipper (see Figure 38). FDL-7 CID &a e…
  • p. 42 …So both Lockheed Aircraft and McDonnell Douglas proposed a self-sustained operational system using recoverable lateral…
  • p. 51 …and logistics requirements, Lockheed, NAS-9-1422. • Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Lockheed, NAS-9-1688. • Manned…
UNCLASSIFIED/ fFOlil OFFl&IAl l:ISlii 8,.lY
but we believed new launch complexes wou ld be required to achieve the desired launch
rates and to accommodate sustained -use vehicles.
Th is all seems impossible given today's launch operations and preparation t ime, but in
1964 it was considered possible both in the Un ited States and in the former Soviet
Union . It appears that two known companies proposed on the MOL support system, as
shown in Figure 38. The Model 176 prelim inary launches were to be on a Martin Titan
IIIC. This was adequate for testing, but the minimum launches for one year of support
of MOL was 74 launches. That 74 Titan IIICs cou ld achieve a sustained manufacturing
rate or a sustained launch rate was not considered. So both Lockheed Aircraft and
McDonnell Douglas proposed a self-sustained operational system using recoverable
lateral propellant tanks. There were no engines on the lateral tanks as there were in
the aircraft since they were simp ly drop tanks.
Lockh e ed Star Clipper
ci rca 1964
Figure 38. A 1964 MDC Astronautics, St. Louis, Briefing Defined a MOL Support System With 10
Launchers That Could Fly 100 Missions a Year for 15 Years. Lockheed Ai rcraft and McDonnell Dougl as both
had can didates.
Atmospheric Variations
The published approach to determining glide range is to assume the global atmosphere
definition is a series of concentric, constant-density shells. The 1962 standa rd
atmosphere fo ll ows the 1959 standard atmosphere and previous standards. NAVAIR-5-
lC-59, Harold Crutchner, 28 details the Northern Hemisphere by month for every 10
degrees of longitude from 1931 to 1964. According to Crutchner, these atmosphere
descriptions were not intended to be eng ineering atmospheres but to be standards to
ensure that aircraft flying globally would have adequate altitude clearance. The 1962
atmosphere represents the average of all daily reports by the worldwide reporting
stations between +30 and +60 degrees latitude for the spring and fall eq uinox minus
one month to plus one month represented as a +45 degree average atmosphere.
UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOlil OFFI&IAl l:ISlii 8Ptllf
McDonnell Douglas
Model 176
circa 1964
35

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.