Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
“Lockheed”5 pages
UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR: 0rr1e1J1tt Y!H: 8HLY forced HTO mode would instead have a gross weight in excess of 1,000 tons. so the resulting observation was "See! Air breathers are not lighter than all-rocket!" And so the rocket proponents have defeated an air-breathing solution since the first aerospace plane in 1958. Launch Options Previously, an option was presented for a mobile launch platform that was limited to an 11- to 12-metric ton (24,225- to 26,460-lb) payload . This section presents a conventional vertical launch site that provides for frequent, scheduled launches and no intrinsic payload weight. In a discussion with the author, Lozino-Lozinski questioned the practicality of the NASP, describing it as nothing more than a very large orbital entry-protected propellant tank. His approach was to minimize the volume of propellant tanks that required orbital-entry protection. Prior to meetin g DARPA's Robert Williams, the MDC had the same philosophy, as shown in Figure 35. 2,370,000 lb 814,500 lb 580,000 lb 301,000 lb 512,000 lb 80,000 lb SSTO 1 1/2 Stage 2 Stage Figure 35. Propellant Tanks That Are Not Reentry Vehicles Greatly Reduce System Weight. Venture star orbital maneuver rules. This was the MDC manned aerospace vehicle approach we briefed before the NASP. The size, thermal protection system surface area, and weight of the SSTO vehicle to just a stage-and-a-half concept is significant. All of the booster segments were fully recoverable and reusable with rebuilding. The cargo capsule was not recoverable. This operational concept envisioned frequent, scheduled launches at least equal in number to those of the 1964 MOL support launcher-that is, 100 to 150 launches a year. UNCLASSIFIED/ tEOR OFFICIO! 1!SE Alli Y 33
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.