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AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

U.S. Department of War · 2010-03-08 · 56 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

  • p. 2 …a series of advanced technology reports produced in FY 2009 under the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense…
  • p. 5 …Among the many advances in space access that will be possible in the future,1 the…
  • p. 10 -- UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR OFFl@IAL l::l!H! 8HL'I McDonnell Aircraft Advanced Design Dept. 1958 to…
  • p. 11 …Louis) Advanced Design organization. The vehicle concept initially conceived in the late 1950s and early 1960s…
  • p. 23 …The photo in Figure 16 is from a Society of Automotive Engineers book titled Advanced Engine…
  • p. 30 …to advance beyond a demonstration tube ended in frustration . Any attempt to open the tube results…
  • p. 32 …Propulsion The photo in Figure 27 is from the Society of Automotive Engineers book, Advanced Engine…
  • p. 38 UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR Offl@IJltt t:191! er\tt I Add ing the switchb lade wing (see…
  • p. 39 …onboard), use legacy correlations from McDonnell Advanced Engineering. The equations for landing and takeoff speeds are…
  • p. 45 …why have we advanced so little (as illustrated in Figure 43)? Like the pioneers' Conestoga wagons…
  • p. 47 …to advance beyond a solitary orbital station with li mited capabilities. Figure 44 identifies the elements…
  • p. 56 …6 Kuchemann, D., "The Aerodynamic Design of Aircraft - A Detailed Introduction to the Current Aerodynamic Knowledge…
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Gross weight trends are shown for five different takeoff wing loadings for horizontal
takeoff and landing (HTOL). Solutions for constant wing loading are shown for values
of tau from 0.2 to 0.063. The curves sweep upward between tau = 0.2 and tau =
0.063 and are variable tau solutions for a fixed takeoff wing loading . The curve for 200
lb/ft2 never converged at tau = 0.063 and is almost vertical. So if 185 knots is an
acceptable takeoff speed, then the maximum weight ratio without significant weight
penalty over vertical takeoff is about 5.6 ( 40 years ago, Dwight Taylor of McDonnell
Aircraft determined the point to be a weight ratio of 5.5). This excludes conventional
rockets but does permit high-performance air-breathing rockets and the KUN cycle.
The point at which the VTOHL and HTOL modes have the same gross weight is then the
maximum weight ratio for which there is no penalty for horizontal takeoff. For
example, at a takeoff wing loading of 976 kg/m 2 (200 lb/ft2), the point at which the
VTOHL and HTOL modes have the same gross weight is for a weight ratio of 5.5, or an
air-breathing speed of mach 6 ± 0.3. For a takeoff wing loading of 610 kg/m 2 (125
lb/ft2), the VTOHL/HTOL boundary is now a weight ratio of 4.3, or an air-breathing
mach 10.5 ± 0.5. This wing loading would be consistent with that of commercial
transports and is also correct to air launch horizontal landing at about mach O. 72 and
35,000 feet. For a takeoff wing loading of 464 kg/m 2 (95 lb/ft2), the VTOHL/HTOL
boundary is now a weight ratio of 3.4, or an air-breathing mach 13 ± 1.0.
For an air-breathing rocket, a mass ratio of 5.0 is achievable, resulting in a gross
weight of about 230 tons. This is less than half the 480 tons for an all-rocket case.
However, if a horizontal takeoff requirement is imposed a priori, the lowest wing
loading for which a practical solution exits is 610.2 kg/m 2 . At that point, the gross
weight for the horizontal takeoff solution is about 800 tons, almost twice the all-rocket
value. If a study team is not aware of the comparison to vertical takeoff, it may draw
the improper conclusion that the propulsion system caused the divergent solution. For
lower wing loading, the solution curve becomes vertical, and the solution will not
converge. The conclusion is that if the weight ratio is greater than 4.3, the best vehicle
configuration is vertical takeoff or an air-launched configuration (all of the vehicles have
a horizontal landing mode). If the goals are the lowest gross weight and the smallest
sized vehicle, then it is important to let the characteristics of the converged solution
themselves determine the takeoff and landing modes. To translate the takeoff wing
loading into takeoff speed and the landing wing loading (operational weight empty plus
10-percent margin, so the launcher can return with payload and fuel residua ls
onboard), use legacy correlations from McDonnell Advanced Engineering. The
equations for landing and takeoff speeds are given below:
{VTO ) knots = J227.114 • LTO
(4)
173.675• LTO(Yw) 1uiots = J173 .675•LLD = WR
As pointed out previously, an a priori selection of horizontal takeoff (HTO) can have a
very deleterious effect on the weight and size of an SSTO launcher. For example, a
VTOHL air-breather propulsion concept should have a gross weight of 300 to 325 metric
tons at takeoff, compared with 750 tons for an all-rocket VTOHL propulsion concept . A
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.