Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR Offl@IJltt t:191! er\tt I Add ing the switchb lade wing (see inset photo in Figu re 10) provides a reasonable takeoff speed for all mass ratios (green triangles). This takeoff speed wi t h the switchblade wing deployed is approximately the landing speed with the wing stowed. With the wing deployed (blue diamonds), the landing speed is almost constant, since all of the launcher vehicles have very similar empty-plus-payload weights (operational weight empty). Then the landing speed becomes very modest, lower even than that of most commercial transports and military aircraft. With this approach, the switchblade wing can be either deployed or stowed, and the landing and takeoff speeds can be essentially equal, adding a degree of operational simplicity. The switchblade wing was designed with the expectation that the gliders would retu rn with greater payloads than they delivered. Landing and takeoff speeds correspond to those of current mil itary aircraft and commercia l transports, at least for the lower mass ratios (5 or less) . Whether the switchblade wing is deployed or st owed, a set of solutions exists in which the landing and takeoff speeds are sim ilar. Figure 34 begins with a solution map of vertical takeoff launchers, as represented by the shaded areas in the lower part of t he figure . All of these data are for converged solutions, whereby the mission requirements are met and the mass and volume of each solution are converged. These solution areas represent t he entire propulsion spectrum, from all -rocket (fa r right) to advanced air-breathing systems (fa r left) . These solution areas are for vertical takeoff and horizontal land ing (VTOH L), with a thrust-to-weight ratio at takeoff (TWTO) of 1.35 and a Kuchemann tau equal to 0.2. 1500 ......... (/) C: B 1000 - .c-.2> ~(/) ~ 500.... CJ 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 payload = 7 tons WING LOADING (kg/m2) 610.2 561 .3 \ \ 463.7 ~ 976.3 TWTO =1 .35 ~ = 0.200 2.0 9.0 WR Weight Ratio to Orbital Figure 34. Horizontal Launch Not Practical Unless Weight Ratio is Less Than Four UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL U.!I! er\tt I 0 31
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.