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This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
UNCLASSIFIED/; FOR OFFICIAL U.!I! er~t'f Air Force in 1964, and elements of that configuration will be shown later. The intent was a 9- to 12-person vehicle for crew rotation that could alternatively carry supplies to the orbital station on a regular, frequent schedule (about one flight per week per vehicle) . The variable geometry switchblade win g permitted landing with heavy loads returning from space and eventually horizontal takeoff. The experimentally determined configuration feature was the tail configuration. This configuration was wind tunnel tested and demonstrated inherent stability and control at speeds ranging from mach 22 to landing speed. Configuration 6 was a product of cooperation between the AFFDL (Richard D. Neumann) and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (Robert Krieger) to reduce t he drag of hypersonic gliders. Based on the physics that a two-dimensional wedge has less drag than a right circular cone of the same volume, these engineers devised the "spatular leading edge." The wind-body configuration formed the basis of the X-20 and DynaSoar configurations that had a limited hypersonic L/D ratio, primarily because of drag. With the spatular nose, the nose wave drag could be reduced by 35 to 40 percent, thus increasing the hypersonic L/D ratio. Configuration 6 was derived from the conventional wing body, configuration 5. Configuration 10 is an adaptation of the Russian "Star Body" concept that can enter in one of three orientations and need not always have one side facing the flow (compression side). The theory was that in a damaged situation, one of the three sides would be available for a safe entry . The limitation of this configuration concept is a small internal volume and a high ratio of wetted (surface) area per planform area that reduces the hypersonic L/D ratio. The X-24B was based on the FDL-8 Martin Mar•tt ■ X-23A configuration. The different approaches to hypersonic glider configuration are best exemp lified by Figure 6. The X- 24A, built by Martin Marietta at its Denver, Colorado, facilities, is a round fuselage configuration with outboard high-dihedral-angle vertical tails. All the configurations of this type have serious lateral-directional stability problems at low speeds and tend to roll about the horizontal axis through the fuselage . One designer, the Russian Glebe Lozino-Lozinski, solved the problem by employing variable dihedral Figure 6. Martin Marietta X-24 A & BResearch tails. The AFFDL solved the problem by Gliders. X-24A based on USAF PRIME config uration. using nonround configurations; that is, the quest for high hypersonic L/D ratios led to the solution of the low speed problem. Under an AFFDL program, Martin Marietta modified the X-24A into a flat-bottomed configuration with trailing edge elevens called the X-24B, shown in Figure 6. Comments by Bill Dana, the NASA pilot who flew the X-15 and the X-24A/B, about the change in the slow speed performance of the X-24B confirmed the advantage of the AFFDL approach. 9 l' 0[ USA f Mod1lied Th• X·24 I UNCLASSIFIED/ /EAR AEEJCJOP 1155 All! X 7
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.