Documents / Report
This 1954 to 1955 U.S. Air Force file brings together records on the Avro Canada "flying saucer" project and on UFO reports. It includes a December 1954 Scientific Advisory Board report, sent by J. H. Doolittle, which found the project warranted only limited support. It also holds a July 1955 intelligence committee evaluation of KC-97 crew sightings and radar returns over Newfoundland, which tentatively blamed electrical phenomena and misinterpretation and recommended fighter scrambles. A November 1955 memo on the CIRVIS reporting program closes the file.
From the source:Release of 2026-07-10 Incident: 1955, Various. This file contains reports, memoranda, and correspondence concerning various then-developmental vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. The file includes assessments of the experimental potential of the “Avro Project Y2,” a joint U.S.-Canadian near-circular VTOL aircraft that is similar in appearance to contemporary popular descriptions of unidentified flying objects (UFO). A 1954 memorandum opines that VTOL aircraft with a circular planform may be mistaken for UFOs to observers unfamiliar with such technologies. It also recommends that UFO reports in the vicinity of Soviet military operations or assets be re-examined to assess whether they may be attributable to previously unknown advanced VTOL aircraft of foreign design. The file also contains correspondence relating to a UFO incident involving a U.S. Air Force (USAF) KC-97 flying near Newfoundland, Canada in July 1955. A USAF committee found that the characteristics described in the report were inconsistent with those of known Soviet, American, or Canadian military systems. The committee was also “unable to explain the simultaneous ground radar returns and aircrew visual sightings.” It also contains correspondence relating to the potential value of data from incidental radar collection of meteors entering the atmosphere. USAF Air Research and Development Command recommended using that data to improve the performance of the AN/FPS-17 radar system. Finally, the file contains correspondence indicating support for the Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings (CIRVIS) program, a joint U.S.-Canadian civil-military program to standardize reporting methods for unusual or unidentified airborne and maritime hazards and threats.
* ., ,. • .;,' ,. .AFOIN-2C4 ' Col. MacDuff/bps/524-66 w/11 July 1955 MEMORANDtM FOR RECORD PROBUM:.. .... -- 1. To evaluate Kc 97 crew sightings and ground radar returns of object in the Newf'o,mdland.. area ( 491 5950W) . FACTS AND DISCUSSION:--··· .... ·----- ...... - 2. OIN-2C directed ·the OIN-2C cotmllJ.ttee 011 8 July to evaluate the 6 July Kc 97 sightings and GCI radar returns over Newfound.land as summarized and detailed inCAF IN 15592, dtd 6 JuJ.y 55 and CAF IN 90703 dtd 7 July 55. 3. In arriving at the following conclusions the conmittee reviewed reports summarizing the incident, the crew interrogations and the NEAD evaluation of the j_nc1.dent. In addition certain new U.S. and Canadian developments in high performance unconventional aircraft were considered. CONCLUSIONS: 4. It was concluded that no intelligence is available to support or deny the existence of unconventional Soviet aircraft comparable to those un.der consideration in the US and Canada and provid1.ng performance such as reported. 5. The committee was unable to explain the simultaneous ground radar returns and aircrew visual sightings, and tentatively accepts the NEAC evaluation attributing the :i.ncident to electrical phenomenon on the one hand and mis interpretation of -the s:i.ghtings by aircrew members on the other. 6. It was further concluded that this inc:f.dent should be classified as UFOB. 7. This i ten1 is not consj_dered suitable for inclusion in D/I Policy Book or the Daily Staff Di..gest. RECCMOOIDATIONS:....... 8. Due to the serious technological threat should tmfriendly nations succeed in developing high performance unconventional ai.rcraft increased effort should be made by all collec·tion agencies to penetrate the Soviet Research and Development establishments a.nd programs in order to give the U.S. adequate warning of any developments in this area. 9. It is further recommended that in the event of future incidents of this nature fighter scrambles be effected without delay. COORDINATION:....... i···• ■ •· I ■■ ■ - ■ U AFOIN-2C4, Col. MacDuff, ext. 52 AFOIN•-2Cl, Lt. Col. Farrior, ext. AFOIN-2C2, CoJ.. Gould, ext. 56200 AFOIN-205, Col. OWynne,,ext. 55538
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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 57 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.