Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
Appendix C. Filter Characteristics
Estimating launch-vehicle failure probabilities using empirical launch data is an
uncertain process when the sample size is small and the data are obtained from an
evolving system. One approach that may be used to estimate failure probabilities is to
perform a least-squares fit to trial outcome values (0 =success, 1 =failure). For mature
launch vehicles, failure probabilities have decreased markedly from their early
experimental days. For new programs, empirical data may be scant or nonexistent.
One decision that must be made involves the type of function to- fit to the data. The
true nature of the failure-rate function may be unknown or extremely complex, or there
may be insufficient data to estimate a complex function. The easiest calculation is made
when a constant failure-rate function is assumed. However, available data appear to
indicate that failure rates decrease as a program matures, at least up to a point. If it can
be assumed that launch-vehicle failure probabilities decrease over time (i.e., as the
number of launches increases), then some non-constant function (perhaps linear or
exponential) can be chosen for the fit, or the data weighted as a function of time. In
estimating Atlas reliability, General Dynamics161 chose the latter option by adopting the
Duane model. ~s model is based on the assumption that the mean number of
launches between failures increases when causes of failure are corrected. Although this
may be the case up to- a point, eventually reliability seems to level off at a fairly
constant value. Consequently, for mature programs RTI has chosen to fit the failure-
rate function to a constant. Su<;h a fit can be based on simple least squares using a
fixed-length sliding-window filter to allow for changes in the estimated value over
time, or on a least squares fitwith unequal weighting.
If a constant function is fit to a set of data using least squares with equal weighting of
data, the solution is given by the mean:
(10)
·Consider the following example:
X1--6
"2 = 5
"3 = 7
Then,
Recursively,
X = 6+5+7 =-18
3 3
= 6 (11)
9/10/96 90 RTI

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.