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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
where p is the probability of occurrence of the GFDF mode, TB is the stage bum time,
and R is the rate of change of the impact range. The function cannot be applied early
in flight before programming when R is essentially zero. The range portion of the
Mode-5 impact-density function used in DAMP reduces to essentially the same form. If
Eq. (3) is integrated between the limits of zero and 1t, the conditional Mode-5 density
function reduces to
(9)
where TP is the programming time, and TB and Rare as previously defined. To obtain
absolute values, f(R) must of course be multiplied by the probability of occurrence of a
Mode-5 failure response.
Although the GFDF density function may be a suitable model for random-attitude
failures occurring at or a few seconds after programming, the performance histories in
Appendix D indicate that such failures are no more likely to occur at programming
than at any other time. Thus, there appears to be no need for including a GFDF mode
per se in the risk calculations, since all random-attitude failures are accounted for by
the Mode-5 density function. However, if for some obscure reason inclusion of a GFDF
response mode is desired, two approaches are possible: (1) run the GFDF mode
separately in DAMP (by using Mode-5 with A = 1) while zeroing out all other response
modes; (2) modify DAMP to handle two separate Mode-5 density functions, each with
its own values of A and B. Obviously approach (2) is much more involved and time
consuming to implement.
Although it may not be obvious, the probability of impact in any annular range interval
obtained by integrating the Mode-5 density function between the interval boundaries is
independent of the values assigned to A and B. I£ Eq. (3) is integrated between the
angle limits of zero and 1t (and only for these limits), the A's and B's cancel leaving the
probability of impact between R,_ and ~ as a function of impact range alone. With a
change of variable, the probability of impacting between R,_ and ~ becomes a simple
function of time (see pages 84 and 85 of Ref. [1] for details).
9/10/96 89 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.