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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 3 …tO Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate or Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferwn Davis Highway, Suite 1204…
  • p. 105 …1995.rsi (3) "Vandenberg AFB Launch Summary", Headquarters 30th Space Wing, Office of History, Launch Chronology…
  • p. 180 …9. "Vandenberg AFB Launch Summary'', Headquarters 30th Space Wing, Office of History, Launch Chronology, 1958 - 1995…
responses begin at vehicle pitch-over or programming for vertically-launched
missiles, and at liftoff for those not launched vertically.
Mode 6: Unlike impacts from response Modes 1 through 5, Mode-6 impacts result
from normal flights and normal impacts of separated stages and components.
Jettisoned components are assumed to be non-explosive. For each impacting stage
or component, a mean point of impact and bivariate-normal impact dispersions in
downrange and crossrange components .are assumed. The impact dispersions
include the effects of variations in vehicle performance, drag uncertainties, and
winds.
Of the five failure-response modes, only Mode 5 is modeled to- allow for the possibility
of failure of the flight termination system, since vehicles experiencing other failure
responses tend to impact within the impact limit lines. In DAMP, risk computations for
Modes 2 through 4 are based on the assumption that the flight termination system is
successfully employed when required. Failure responses originally classified as
Mode 2, 3, or 4 may be reclassified as Mode 5 if the flight termination system fails or
subsequent vehicle performance does not conform with the original response-mode
definition. Risks associated with vehicle failure responses accompanied by a failure of
the flight termination system are assumed to be adequately modeled in DAMP" by
Mode 5. •
The five failure-response modes modeled in DAMP are sufficient to account for all
anomalous impacts in the estimation of risks. However, some vehicle failures and
anomalous behaviors have an effect on mission success without increasing risks to
people and property on the ground. These behaviors have been assigned Mode NA
(not applicable) in the response-mode column of the launch-history tables in
Appendix D.
9/10/96 80 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.