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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
Appendix A. Failure Response Modes In Program DAMP
In program DAMP, no attempt is made to model vehicle behavior for failure of specific
systems and components. A list of such failures and possible behaviors for any vehicle
would be extensive, and variations from vehicle to vehicle would complicate the
modeling process, or make it almost impossible. Instead, failure responses are modeled
in DAMP without regard to the specific failure that causes the response. There are only
six possible response modes in DAMP, five for failures, and one to model the behavior
of a normal vehicle. The six vehicle-response modes are described in layman's
language as follows; technical descriptions are provided in Ref. [1].
Mode 1: Vehicle topples over or falls back on the launch point after a rise of, at
most, a few feet. Propellants deflagrate or explode with some assumed TNT
equivalency.
Mode 2: Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions
equally likely. Destruct is transmitted as soon as erratic flight is confirmed, usually
no later than six to twelve seconds after launch. For each vehicle, a latest destruct
time is established that is used in computing the maximum impact distance for
pieces, given that a Mode-2 response has occurred.
Mode 3: Vehicle fails to pitch-program normally, producing near-vertical flight
while thrusting at normal levels. Vehicle may tumble rapidly out of control at any
point during vertical flight resulting in spontaneous breakup, or may be destroyed
when destruct criteria are violated. The mode is terminated by destruct action if
the vehicle reaches the so-called 11straight-up" time without programming. This
time varies with launch vehicle and with mission, but usually occurs (at Cape
Canaveral Air Station) between 30 and 70 seconds after launch.
Mode 4: Vehicle flies within normal limits until some malfunction terminates
thrust, causes spontaneous breakup, or results in destruct by flight-control
personnel. Breakup may or may not be preceded by a rapid tumble while the
vehicle is still thrusting but, in any event, vehicle debris and components impact
near the intended flight line.
Mode 5: Vehicle may impact in any direction from the launch point within its
range capability. At any range, impacts are most likely to ocrur along the flight
line, becoming less likely as the angular deviation from the flight line increases. As
the impact range increases, weighting is progressively increased to favor the
downrange direction. In any fixed direction, the impact probability decreases as
the impact range increases. Flight may terminate spontaneously due to complete
loss of vehicle stability or because of destruct action Outside the launch area, any
malfunction with the potential to cause a substantial deviation from the intended
flight direction is classified as a Mode-5 failure response. By definition, Mode-5
9/10/96 79 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.