Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
Traditionally, a value of B = 1,000 has been used by the 45 SW/SE in ship-hit
calculations, and by RTI in performing launch-area risk analyses for the 45 SW/SE.
Using this value. of B, for each vehicle values of A were found that produced a good
match between simulated and theoretical data. The results for qa = 5,000, 10,000, and
20,000 deg-lb/ft2 are given in Table 31. As discussed earlier in the report, no single
value of A could be found that produced a good fit over the entire 180° sector, although
with one exception a good match did exist in the uprange portion of the sector from
about ±90° to ±180°. For launches from Cape Canaveral, most population centers are
located in this uprange sector. For any launch-area population centers located in the
downrange sector, the risks are almost surely dominated by the Mode-4 failure
response.
Table 31. Summary of A Values for B = 1,000
Flight TB Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft2)
Vehicle Phase (sec) 5,000 10,000 20,000
Atlas HAS 0-2 280 3.45 3.20 2.75
Delta-GEM 0-1 270 4.30 3.10 2.90
Titan IV 0-1 300 3.50 3.25 2.95
LLVl 0-2 290 2.75 2.70 2.60
Other vehicles --- --- 3.5 3.1 2.8
Other values of B were investigated to find combinations of B and A that provided the
best possible data fits over the largest possible portion of the 0° to 180° sector.
Although no combinations of A and B could be found that produced good fits for the
entire 180° sector, the values shown in Table 32 extended the fit from the uprange
direction to within about 40° of the downrange direction.
Table 32. Summary of Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants
Flight TB Breakupqa
Vehicle · Phase (sec) (deg-lb/ ft2) B A
Atlas 0-2 280 5,000 5,000,000 6.30
Delta 0-1 270 5,000 4 3.50
Titan 0-1 300 5,000 1,000 3.50
LLVl 0-2 290 5,000 1,000 2.75
Launch-area risk calculations were made for Atlas and Delta to ascertain the effects of
using radically different values of A and Bin the Mode-5 impact-density function. For
example, for a breakup qa of 5,000 deg-lb/ft2, values of A= 3.45 and B = 1,000 from
Table 31 and A= 6.30 and B = 5,000,000 from Table 32 were used to determine total
Mode-5 launch-area risks for an Atlas HAS launch from Complex 36. The total risks
differed by about 10%. (Other results for Atlas HAS are given in Table 21, and for Delta
in Table 23.) Other calculations for Atlas and Delta show that the value of B is not
9/10/96 77 RTI

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.