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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
these results, the relative probabilities used were more precise than those given in
Table 28 and Table 29. No pretense is made that all figures in Table 30 are actually
significant.
Table 30. Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1 - 5
Vehicle: Atlas Delta
0-1 0-2
(0-270 sec) (0-630 sec)
Titan
0-1 0-2
(0-300 sec) (0-540 sec)
Flight
Phase:
0-1
(0-170 sec)
0-2
(0-280 sec)
Model 0.000119 0.000121 0.000054 0.000051 0.000216 0.000250
0.003437Mode2
Mode3
0.001637
0.000011
0.001665 0.000744 0.000698 0.002976
0.000012 0.000005 0.000005 0.000020 0.000026
Mode4 0.018007 0.026738 0.008185 0.011212
0.001012 0.001034
0.032740
0.004048
0.055200
0.005088Mode5 0.002226 0.002465
Total 0.022 0.031 0.010 0.013 nn11n 0.064
The same chronological composite sample used to estimate relative failure probabilities
for the failure-response modes was used to estimate the conditional probability that a
Mode-3 or Mode-4 response terminates with a rapid tumble. This was found to be
about one-third (see Section 5.3).
Because the empirical data were insufficient to determine Mode-5 density-function
shaping constants A and B, an alternate approach was used. Basically, for each of four
vehicles (Atlas, Delta, Titan, and LLVl), Mode-5 failure responses were simulated at a
series of failure times. The simulated malfunctions investigated were random-attitude
turns and slow turns. At each time, 10,000 impact points were computed. The
percentages of impacts in 5° sectors from 0° (downrange) to 180° (uprange) were
determined. These were compared with the percentages obtained in the same sectors
from the theoretical Mode-5 impact-density function when specific values were
assigned to A and B. By trial and error, values of A and B producing a good match
between the two sets of percentages were established (see Section 6). After best-fit
values were determined, the impact percentages for Atlas HAS in 10-mile range
increments were checked to verify that the range part of the Mode-5 impact-density
function was consistent with impact ranges resulting from 266,000 simulated Mode-5
failure responses (see Section 6.2.4).
Since the impact distributions resulting from simulated malfunction turns were highly
dependent upon the dynamic pressure (qa) assumed to cause vehicle breakup, shaping
constants A and B were likewise dependent on breakup assumptions. Three breakup
qa's and a no-breakup case were investigated by-simulating 270,000 malfunction turns
for each of the four conditions. Although a qa of 5,000 deg-lb/ft2 is considered most
likely applicable for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, shaping constants for all breakup
conditions were provided earlier in Section 6.
9/10/96 76 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.