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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 5 …64 6.4 Shaping Constants for Titan IV................................................................................ 65 6.5 Shaping Constants for LLVl .................................................................................... 69…
  • p. 74 …6.4 Shaping Constants for Titan IV Mode-5 shaping constants for Titan IV were developed…
  • p. 77 …Shaping Constants for Titan IV TB (sec) Breakupqa (deg-lb/ft2) B A II 300 none…
  • p. 109 …Titan IIIC and later configurations to include IIIB, IIID, IIIE, 34B, 34D, III/CT, IV, II…
  • p. 155 …Titan II SLV was developed from refurbished Titan II ICBMs incorporating technology and hardware from the…
  • p. 156 …Summa of Titan Vehicle Confi rations Descri Titan II ICBM converted to a man-rated vehicle…
  • p. 159 …2 0 54 WS (first Titan II) 03/16/62 II (N-2) ER 0 55…
  • p. 160 …08/13/64 II (8-7) WR 0 104 SV (first Titan Ill) 09/01/64…
  • p. 166 D.4.2 Titan Failure Narratives The following narratives provide available details about each Titan failure…
  • p. 168 …Stage II engine shut down prematurely due to oxidizer bootstrap-line failure. 76. Titan I (Mares…
  • p. 169 …Titan II (Thread Needle), 20 June 63, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Flight appeared normal…
  • p. 170 …Titan II (Bold Guy), 21 Sep 65, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: After a normal…
  • p. 172 …Following a successful Titan-II second-stage burn and after payload separation, the apogee- kick motor…
6.3.2 Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks
Using values of A and B from Figure 24 and Figure 25, program DAMP was run to
compute Mode-5 launch-area risks for population centers inside the impact limit lines
for a Delta-GEM/GPS-10 daytime launch from Pad 17A. Results from these and two
other cases are shown in Table 23. The Mode-5 Ee in the first line (old baseline case) is
presented for comparison. It was obtained from the first line of Table 55 of an- earlier
RTI study31• In that study, the total Delta failure probability during the first 130
seconds of flight was set at 0.02, with the probability of a Mode-5 response assumed to
be 0.0025. The second line in Table 23 shows the result of a recomputation of the Mode-
s risks, again with B =1,000 and A =3, using failure probabilities derived earlier in this
report. From Table 6 and Table 15, the failure probability during flight phases O- 2 is
0.013, and the relative frequency of occurrence of a Mode-5 response is 0.08. The
absolute probability of a Mode-5 response thus becomes 0.013 x 0.08 =0.001.
Table 23. Shaping Constants and Related Risks for Delta-GEM
TB Breakupqa Mode-5 Ee
Ps (sec) (deg-lb/ft2) B A (x 104,)
0.0025 130 12,000 * 1,000 3.00 394
(baseline)
0.001 270 12,000 * 1,000 3.00 88.8
(newp,&T,.)
0.001 270 none 1,000 1.90 220.0
20,000 2.90 104.4
10,000 3.10 74.1
5,000 4.30 5.2
0.001 270 none 10,000 2.60 224.4
20,000 2,000 3.15 102.4
10,000 2,000 3.35 72.0
5,000 4 3.50 5.1
* Interpolated from data contained in Figure 24
As in the case of Atlas, Table 23 again shows that the risks in the launch area are highly
dependent on qa and thus on A, but relatively insensitive to changes in B if a proper
value is selected for A. For example, if qa. =10,000, the computed risks for B =1,000
(A= 3.10) and B = 2,000 (A= 3.35) differ by-less than 3%. For the no-breakup cases
where B = 1,000 and then 10,000, the computed risks in the launch area differ by less
than2%.
Launch-area risks are highly dependent on the vehicle's capability to withstand
aerodynamic forces. Except early in flight, low-strength vehicles generally break up
quickly after a malfunction turn begins. The later such turns occur, the more likely
pieces are to impact downrange of the launch point, thus lessening risks to uprange
populations. The effects of vehicle strength on risk are clearly seen in Table 23 where,
9/10/96 64 RT!

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.