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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
cumulative angle turned versus time. Since the slope of the curve (i.e., the turning rate)
is greatest when the thrust (and thus airframe) is directed at right angles to the velocity
vector, the average angular acceleration during the first 90° of rotation was obtained
from the equation
(4)
so that
8 = 2 8(deg) = 180 deg (5)
t2 (sec2 ) t2 sec2
where t is the elapsed time from the beginning of the tumble tum until the airframe has
rotated approximately 90°. If the assumption is made that the angular acceleration is
directly proportional to the thrust offset angle (i.e., nozzle deflection), the angular
acceleration 0d for any small deflection angle becomes
(6)
where 0 is the angular acceleration computed from Eq. (5) for deflection angle 6 (1° for
Atlas IIAS), and 6d is some small deflection angle.
Using the Atlas IIAS data, angular accelerations 8 were computed at ten-second
intervals from the programming time of 15 seconds to 275 seconds for 6 = 1°. For each
starting time, a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.1°
was sampled to obtain an initial thrust misalignment 6d to substitute in Eq. (6). The
resulting angular acceleration 8d was applied throughout the. tum. Slow-tum
calculations were made in a manner analogous to the random-attitude turns, using the
reference trajectory to obtain the starting position and velocity components. The slow
turn was assumed to occur in a randomly oriented plane containing the starting
velocity vector. Each turn was carried out until one of the four conditions listed in
Section 6.1.1 for random-attitude turns was met. For conditions (1) and (4), impact
points were calculated and, along with thrusting impacts from condition (2), summed
for each five-degree sector from 0° to 175°. At each starting time, 10,000 impact-point
calculations were made.
6.1.3 Factors Affecting Malfunction-Turn Results
Random-attitude turns and slow turns are only subsets of the totality of Mode-5 failure
responses. As discussed earlier in Section 3, other types of behavior following a Mode-
s failure are numerous and largely impossible to categorize, much less simulate.
Ideally, impact distributions from all types of Mode-5 responses should be combined
before results are compared with those obtained from the theoretical Mode-5 impact
9/10/96 33 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.