Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
6. Shaping Constants Through Simulation
Since adequate test data are not available to establish the Mode-5 shaping constants
empirically, other methods are needed for this purpose. It will be recalled that, after
vehicle pitchover, any malfunction with the potential to cause a substantial deviation
from the intended flight line is, by definition, a Mode-5 failure response. The
malfunction need not actually cause a large deviation to be classified as a Mode-5
response. One such class of failures leading to a Mode-5 response has been termed a
random-attitude failure. Such responses can result from guidance and control failures
that lead to erroneous orientation of the guidance platform or an erroneous spatial
target. Another class of failures that can cause sustained deviation away from the flight
line is the slow turn, where the engine nozzle, in effect, locks in some fixed position,
generally but not necessarily near null. Both types of malfunctions have been
investigated in an attempt to estimate numerical values for Mode-5 shaping constants A
and B. Basically, the idea is to (1) run a large sample of random-attitude and slow-tum
failures, (2) calculate the percentages of impacts in five-degree sectors from 0° to 180°,
(3) compare these percentages with those obtained from the Mode-5 impact density
function when specific values are assigned to A and B, and (4) assign values to A and B
until the best pos~ible fit is obtained between the simulated-tum impacts and the
theoretical Mode-5 impacts.
6.1 Malfunction Turn Slmulatlons
6.1.1 Random-Attitude Failures
A guidance and control failure leading to a fixed erroneous direction of thrust is
termed a random-attitude failure. Such failures represent a subset of possible Mode-5
failure responses. Random-attitude failures can be used to establish the maximum
possible region of impact, given that a vehicle has flown normally for a specified period
of time. For this purpose RTI has developed a Random-Attitude Failure Impact Point
(RAFIP) program written in Fortran (3900 lines of code) for execution on a personal
computer.
Using a Monte Carlo approach, program RAFIP first selects a starting time and then a
random thrust direction on the attitude sphere, with all directions having the same
chance of being chosen. Each Monte-Carlo run is begun using the nominal vehicle
position and velocity at the selected start time, assuming an instantaneous change in
thrust direction. Thrust is applied continuously in the selected random direction, and
the equations of motion are numerically integrated until one of four conditions is
satisfied: (1) final stage burnout occurs, (2) the vehicle impacts while thrusting,
(3) orbital insertion occurs, (4) the vehicle breaks up due to aerodynamic forces
For conditions (1) and (4), the trajectory is extended to impact using Kepler's equations.
For condition (3), an impact point does not exist. The process just described is repeated
9/10/% 31 RT!

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.