Documents / Report
This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.
From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.
0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 >- ~ 0.08 :a .c ca 0.07 ea.. 0.06 (l) lo... ::J 0.05 'ffi u.. 0.04"C (l) lo... (l) 0.03 =u:: 0.02 0.01 0.00 ..............i.................!................J................. L...............!...-.-.J ..F.=..o.97..... : i i i i : F i 1 11 i i i i - =0~98 ••••• ······1· ··············1·················1·················1·················j···-----i••F·=··~~99····· i \\ i i ! \ ; \ ;',,, .............LI'~:-~:t-1-1········---1' ..............r,,~- ............. ;OOOOOOOppO&aOOOOO; •••••••••••••••••;••ooOOOOOOOOOOOOO ;OOOOOO ■ OOOOOOOHO; ..•••••••••••••••; OOOOO ■ OHHOOOOOO ; ■ --600000000 .. I ! ! l i ! i 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Sample Index (newer->) Figure 4. Filter Factor Results for Representative Configurations of Atlas In summary, it must be recognized that there is no "correct'' value for F, and that it is even difficult to argue generally that one value of F is better than another. In RTI's view, values of F below 0.97 place too much emphasis on a relatively small sample of recent launches. Values above 0.99 extend the sample so far back in time that too little emphasis is placed on improvements in design, materials, and operational procedures. In any event, the value chosen for F is crucial in arriving at a predicted failure probability. For the more conservative, a value of 0.99 can be chosen; the optimistic might chose 0.97. Since most risk-analysis studies that RTI makes are concerned with the launch area, failure probabilities beyond flight-phase 2 are of minor interest. The overall failure probabilities shown in Table 6 have, with one exception, been extracted from Table 2 for F = 0.98. Where a best estimate is called for, RTI plans to use these probabilities in future launch-area risk analyses for the 45 SW/SE unless directed otherwise, or until additions to the data samples in Appendix D justify changes. 9/10/96 23 RTI
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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.