Documents / Report
Department of the Air Force Report, 1996
U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer
This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.
From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.
“Mission Control”17 pages
- p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions
equally likely. Destruct is…
- p. 106 …121
(8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight
Control and Analysis…
- p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the
attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives.
50…
- p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon,
and primary mission…
- p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a
failure. No other data available.
134…
- p. 133 …A flight-control
malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
- p. 137 …Vehicle became
unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
- p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard
yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
- p. 139 …of the
rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
- p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a
result…
- p. 151 …Attitude control lost during
second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
- p. 153 …One solid-rocket
motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success.
102. SMS…
- p. 169 …Missile tumbled out
of control at 130 seconds, then broke up.
104. IHA (65-210), 1…
- p. 170 …Nominal
mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine
failed to shutdown following vernier…
- p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned
putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
- p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory
inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
- p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control
and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
Table 1. Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constant A on Atlas IIA Risks
B = 1,000 Percent of Mode-5
IPs Uprange
28.6
Casualty Expectancv (x 10°') inside ILLs
Modes Total for all Modes
246 259.9
Constant A
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
20.7
14.6
10.0
136 149.4
58.9 72.7
30.5 44.3
The results in·the third column are directly proportional to the probability that a Mode-
5 failure occurs. For the Atlas IIA analysis, a value of 1/200 = 0.005 was assumed.
Case 2: Risk Contours for Atlas IIAS
Definitions of Flight Hazard Area and Flight Caution Area may be based on the risk
contours for inner-ear injury. Constant A can have a significant effect on the location of
the 10-6 contour, as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the Atlas IIAS. For these
figures, the Mode-5 absolute probability of occurrence was 0.005, constant A was 3.0
and 3.5, and constant B was 1000.
9/10/96 10 RTI
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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.