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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives
The following narratives provide information about flight failure of Thor weapons system
and Thor-boosted space vehicle launches beginning with the first Thor launch in January
1957. The narratives are numbered to match the flight-sequence numbers in Section D.5.1.
1. 101, 25 Jan 57, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Failure of fuel-system valve
resulted in loss of thrust. Missile fell back on pad after reaching an altitude of
only 9 inches.
2. 102, 19 Apr 57, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Missile was apparently
performing normally until destroyed by the RSO at 34.7 seconds. Erroneous
DOVAP beat-beat plot showed missile heading uprange.
3. 103, 21 May 57, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Missile was destroyed on the
pad at T - 5 minutes. A faulty fuel-tank regulator and relief valve resulted in
ov~r-pressurizing and bursting of fuel tank.
4. 104, 30 Aug 57, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Spurious signals in the main-
engine yaw fe~dback circuit resulted in missile breakup shortly after 92 seconds.
5. 105, 20 Sep 57, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Premature propellant depletion
• resulted in impact some 400 miles short of target.
6. 107, 3 Oct 57, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Main fuel valve closed 1.25
seconds after liftoff. Missile fell back on pad after reaching an altitude of about 17
feet.
7. .108, 11 Oct 57, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Due to a mechanical failure, an
abnormal main-engine shutdown (one second early) resulted in loss of the vernier
solo phase ..
9. 112, 7 Dec 57, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: An electrical-system failure at 107
seconds produced an abnormal loading on the missile converter.. The missile
began deviating at 110 seconds and finally broke up at about 224 seconds (well
after MECO at 156 seconds). Missile impacted 200 miles downrange and 40 miles
left of flight line.
10. 113, 19 Dec 57, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1.5: Flight was regarded as
successful although there was no vernier solo operation and impact was 6 miles
from target.
11. 114, 28 Jan 58, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: Guidance system failure at 95
seconds resulted in erroneous steering commands causing the vehicle to yaw left
and pitch down. Divergence began about 110 seconds and continued until the
9/10/96 167 RT!

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.