Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
S/ A-1 shut down at 213 sec due to failure of its turbopump assembly. The vehicle
continued flight till 221 seconds when erratic attitude rates were noted. At 229
seconds, the impact point stopped. At 257 seconds, the pressure dropped to zero
in the stage-1 thrust-chamber assembly 2. At the same time, stages 1 and 2
separated as stage 2 ignited. After this time, stage-2 attitude rates were erratic.
Destruct was sent by the RSO at 273 seconds.
307. 34D (AFSC), 18 Apr 86, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 0: At about 8.8 seconds
after liftoff, the insulation and case of SRM No. 2 debonded resulting in case
rupture immediately thereafter. The core vehicle was destroyed by fragments
from the ruptured motor. Auto-destruct was activated on SRM-1 at 9.0 seconds.
311. 34D-3/Transtage, 2 Sep 88, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: Transtage
pressurization system failed due to damage to the upper portion of the transtage
fuel tank and pressurization lines. A_ leak of 1,340 pounds occurred during park
orbit, and a large helium-tank gas leak occurred during transtage first burn. Not
enough helium was left in system to allow start of second bum. The payload was
left in a geostationary transfer orbit.
315. Titan IV-1/IUS, 14 June 89, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1: Late in Stage-1
burn, one of the engines failed and shut down. The other engine was able to
gimbal sufficiently to maintain control until propellant depletion. Trajectory
inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission was a
success.
319. Commercial Titan, 14 Mar 90, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5 and 5: Boost
phase was satisfactory. The payload separation system was designed for two
satellites and had two discrete outputs from the missile guidance computer
(MGC), but for this mission it carried only a single satellite. The wiring team
miswired the harness, which connected the MGC payload-separation discretes to
the payload separation device, so the satellite never received the separation signal.
PKM and satellite did not separate from Stage II resulting in low-earth elliptical
orbit. Ground controllers were able to separate satellite hours later but PKM
remained attached to Stage II.
328. IV, 2 Aug 93, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 0: A leak occurred in SRM#l at 99.9
seconds that rapidly enveloped the vehicle in propellant gases. Approximately
1.6 seconds later the vehicle blew up and disintegrated, apparently due to
activation of the inadvertent-separation destruct system. . Destruct was
transmitted at 104.5 seconds.
329. II/SLV (Landsat 6), 5 Oct 93, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Following a
successful Titan-II second-stage burn and after payload separation, the apogee-
kick motor failed to ignite and circularize the highly-elliptical orbit. The Landsat
payload and Titan II followed a ballistic trajectory back into the atmosphere
where bumup occurred.
9/10/96 163 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.