Documents / Report
This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.
From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.
“Titan II”13 pages
200. IIIC-19, 6 Nov 70, Vehicle 19, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 3.5 and 5: All booster systems performed essentially as planned. Transtage experienced a guidance anomaly during coast prior to second bum resulting in an improper orbit. 212. IIIB/ Agena D (AFSC), 16 Feb 72, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: After an apparently normal Titan III B boost phase, the Agena failed to- ignite. The payload impacted about 1500 miles downrange. 232. Titan IIIE, #El, 11 Feb 74, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: All Titan booster functions and Centaur separation were properly performed~ Centaur stage failed to ignite. 244. TIIIC-25, 20 May 75, Vehicle 25, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: All systems performed satisfactorily through Stage 11/111 separation. About 230 milliseconds after staging discrete was issued, the IMU power supply failed. Transtage then tumbled and the first transtage bum failed to occur leaving transtage and attached· payload in the parking orbit. 252. TIIIC-29, 14 Dec 75, Vehicle 29, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: All launch vehicle objectives were met. However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission capability. 261. 111B/Agena D (AFSC), 15 Sep 76, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The stage-2 engine failed to respond to shutdown commands and thus burned to propellant depletion. Cause was thought to be a hard contaminant that blocked the fuel valve. 268. 23E-6/Centaur D-lT, 5 Sep 77, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2: Flight was regarded as a success, although the second-stage velocity was low, probably due to a detached line diffuser lodged on top of the prevalve. 272. TIIIC-17, 25 Mar 78, Vehicle 35, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Vehicle performance was satisfactory until 16.4 seconds beyond Stage-2 start. At this time the Stage-2 hydraulic system began and continued over-pressurizing until the system burst after 125 seconds of Stage-2 operation. The pressure then dropped to . zero, the vehicle tumbled out of control, and guidance shut down the second stage after detecting negative acceleration. The RSO sent arm at 629 seconds and destruct at 630 seconds. 306. 34D (AFSC), 28 Aug 85, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: The first-stage engine suffered three separate major anomalies: (1) during subassembly-2 (S/ A-2) start transient (110 sec), a large oxidizer leak of 165 lb/sec occurred in the oxidizer suction line; (2) at 213 seconds, an internal fuel leak of 30 lb/sec occurred in S/ A-1 downstream of the combustion chamber and created a vehicle side force; (3) the 9/10/96 162 RTI
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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.