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Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
however, involve the quantity R which is expressed explicitly as a function of R and only
implicitly as a function·of time. Values of R from the nominal trajectory are differenced to
computeR.
The secondary Mode-5 impact-density function is circular normal in form and expressed by
the equation
(2)
where d is the distance from the impact point of the mean piece to the center of the target,
and oc is the standard deviation (dispersion) for the debris class. The fact that the center of
the secondary impact-density function (or secondary MPI for a debris class) lies Off some
population center does not necessarily mean that pieces in the class hit the center. The
probability that one or more pieces actually hits the pop center is determined by integrating
the secondaryimpact-density function over the center and combining results for all pieces
in the class. The dispersions for the secondary function are computed by root-sum-
squaring individual dispersions• arising from the effects of winds, vehicle-breakup
velocities, and drag uncertainties for the class. They are computed from the nominal
trajectory, and cari be explicitly expressed as a function· of impact range. Since the pop
center can also be hit if the MPI of the secondary density function lies outside the pop
center, all possible mutually-exclusive locations of the secondary function that can result in
impact on the pop center must be considered. For each mutually-exclusive location, the
probability that one or more class pieces impacts on the pop center is calculated, and the
results combined to obtain the total hit probability for the class.
The Mode-5 primary impact-density function is modeled so· it is independent of how the
impact point arrives at a particular location For example, there are myriad paths that a
vehicle can travel to impact at a location two miles crossrange left from the launch pad.
Figure 1 shows one such way for a Joust vehicle that failed at 15 seconds, but four seconds
later had moved the impact point uprange and CTO$!ange to a position two miles
crossrange left from the launch point. Another way to place the impact point two- miles
•crossrange left is for the vehicle to fly in the wrong direction (north instead of east) from
liftoff.
Although numerous failure mechanisms and vehicle behaviors can lead to a Mode-5
response and impact in a particular area, the exact mechanism and behavior are irrelevant
All such possibilities are assumed to be accounted for by Eq. (1). Four specific failures that
produce Mode-5 responses are easily- described: (1) a re-orientation of the guidance
platform, (2) insertion of an erroneous spatial target into the guidance system, (3) locking of
the engine nozzle in a fixed position near null thus producing a near-constant angular
* These dispersions are a subset of the Mode-4 impact dispersions.
9/10/96 8 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.