Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
50% reduction of sustainer thrust for remainder of Stage II operation. Impact was
2888 miles short of target.
. 63. I (Yellow Jacket), 5 Dec 62, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Missile was
command destructed at 250 seconds. No other data available.
64. N-11, 6 Dec 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Stage I shut down 11.4 seconds
early. As a result, no inertial velocity-dependent discretes were issued and Stage
II shut down prematurely, apparently due to an oxidizer bootstrap-line failure.
66. N-15, 10 Jan 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Stage II flight was terminated
by backup SECO approximately 34 seconds after ignition because low thrust
caused velocity to fall below performance criteria. Cause of low thrust was
reduced oxidizer flow through the gas-generator injector. Impact only 556 miles
downrange.
68. N-16, 6 Feb 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Oxidizer depletion prior to
normal SECO resulted in impact 71 miles short of target.
69. N-7 (Awful Tired), 16 Feb 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Missile self-
destructed at .56 seconds at an altitude of 18,000 feet due to loss of roll control.
Failure was caused by improper umbilical release at launch and subsequent loss
of vehicle electrical control.
70. N-18, 21 Mar 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2.5: Although vernier ignition
was normal, vernier #2 received no commands, and gimbaled erratically 2.8
seconds later. R/V attitude was incorrect at separation so that impact was 4 to 5
miles short of target.
74. N-21, 19 Apr 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Stage II engine shut down
prematurely due to oxidizer bootstrap-line failure.
76. Titan I (Mares Tail), 1 May 63, Response Mode 2, Flight Phase 1: The missile was
erratic from liftoff as one engine either failed at liftoff or shutdown immediately
thereafter. The missile rose about 50 feet, then fell uprange from the launch pad
about 7.5 seconds after liftoff.
77. N-14, 9 May 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Oxidizer depletion due to a leak
resulted in premature Stage II shutdown and impact short of target.
80. N-20, 29 May 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: A fuel leak in Stage I engine
compartment at ignition caused a fire that spread through the engine
compartment. Stage I destroyed itself at 52 seconds. Stage II was destroyed by
RSO.
9/10/96 159 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.