Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
28. J-9, 20 Dec 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: No Stage-Ilignition due to failure
of gas generator to start.
29. J-10, 20 Jan 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: No- Stage-II operation due to
erroneous signal that appeared at umbilical disconnect. Impact some 420 miles
downrange.
32. J-12, 3 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Stage-II terminated prematurely
after 54-second burn, apparently due to failure of pump drive assembly. Impact
was 730 miles downrange.
34. J-15, 31 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Booster shut down prematurely
at 74 seconds. Missile subsequently tumbled and broke up.
37. M-1, 24 Jun 61, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Stage II engine shut down
prematurely after 12 seconds of operation due to loss of Stage II hydraulic power.
Loss of hydraulic power occurred during Stage I flight, so failure led to loss of
control of sustainer and vernier actuators, producing excessive missile motion and
tumbling.
42. M-3, 7 Sep 61, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: A transient in guidance computer
at 218.35 seconds (SECO at 297.7 seconds) caused impact 20 miles short and 2.8
miles left of target.
45. M-4, 6 Oct 61, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: A one-bit error in the W velocity
accumulation caused impact 86 miles short and 14 miles right of target.
50. M-6, 15 Dec 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Start signal for Stage II was not
generated. Stage II did not ignite.
51. I, 20 Jan 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Missile self-destructed, apparently
after Stage 2 failed to ignite. A backup automatic fuel-cutoff signal was sent at
248 Seconds. •
53. I, 23 Feb 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Missile sell-destructed, apparently
after Stage 2 failed to ignite. A backup automatic fuel cutoff signal was sent at 240
Seconds.
56. N-1, 7 Jun 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer engine performance was
subnormal due to reduced oxidizer flow through the gas generator. RSO
terminated flight after a prolonged sustainer bum. Impact only 1100 miles
downrange.
58. N-4, 25 July 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: After about 60 seconds of Stage
II bum, a fuel leak between the thrust chamber valve and the injector resulted ·in a
9/10/96 158 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.