Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
D.3.2 Delta Failure Narratives
The following narratives provide available details about each Delta failure since the
beginning of the Delta program. The narratives are numbered to match the flight-
sequence numbers in Section D.3.1.
1. Echo I, 13 May 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Attitude control lost during
second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire.
10. Tiros E, 19 June 62, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: The flight was considered
a success, although failure of the BTL guidance system resulted in a propellant-
depletion shutdown of the second stage. The apogee of the final orbit was 175
miles above the planned value and well outside the three-sigma limit of 76 miles.
24. S-66, 19 Mar 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: Spacecraft did not attain orbit.
Third-stage bum of X-248 motor was interrupted after 23 seconds of a planned 42-
second bum period.
26. Imp B, 3 Oct 64, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: The flight was considered a
partial success, although it failed to reach the desired orbital altitude. The apogee
was some 52,590 miles below the planned value of 110,000 miles, but perigee was
within 3 miles of the desired value of 105 miles.
28. Tiros I, 22 Jan 65, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2 and 5: Loss of WECO
guidance during second-stage burn caused second stage to burn to oxygen
depletion. As a result, spacecraft was inserted into an elliptical rather than a
circular orbit.
33. O50-C, 25 Aug 65, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Third stage ignited after
spin up but before separation from second-stage spin table. Payload did not orbit.
34. GEOS A, 6 Nov 65, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2 and 5: The flight was
considered a success, although failure of the BTL guidance system during second-
stage powered flight led to a propellant-depletion shutdown of the stage. Actual
apogee was 436 miles too high, and well outside the three-sigma limit.
38. AF-ff, 25 May 66, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2 and 5: Due to- WECO
guidance failure (ground system·Iocked on side lobe), second stage burned to
propellant depletion, some 12 seconds longer than expected. As a result, the
orbital apogee was 800 miles higher than planned.
39. AIMP-D, 1 July 66, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5 and 5: Although an
alternate mission was accomplished, primary objectives could not be achieved
because excess velocity imparted to the spacecraft prevented insertion of the
9/10/96 142 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.