Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
191. 163D (Cool Water V), 7 Oct 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Flight was
normal up to about 73 seconds when the missile exploded. Suspected cause was
intermediate bulkhead reversal/rupture due to insufficient helium pressure.
194. 136F (ABRES), 28 Oct 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: After a normal
booster phase and staging, failure of sustainer hydraulic system resulted in loss of
sustainer control and stability at 138 seconds. Sustainer and vernier engines shut
down at 260 seconds, some 28 seconds early. The R/V impacted about 507 miles
downrange.
196. 158D (Cool Water VI)., 13 Nov 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The trajectory
was low throughout flight. The sustainer/vernier hydraulic pressure was lost at
112.7 seconds, followed by missile self-destruct at about 118 seconds when the
vacuum impact point was about 280 miles downrange and on azimuth.
202. 48E (Blue Bay), 12 Feb 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The booster engine
shut down at 119.5 seconds, and the sustainer engine shut down prematurely at
198.8 seconds. Impact was near the flight line about 635 miles downrange.
207. 3F (High Ball), 3 Apr 64, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Missile was destroyed
on the pad when the Bl booster engine failed to ignite.
212. 135D (AC-3), 30 June 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: The Centaur engines
shut down early, apparently due to a hydraulic coupling failure that led to a
failure in the propellant system. Impact was about 2340 miles downrange.
219. 57E (Gallant Gal), 27 Aug 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Missile
experienced an early SECO with no vernier bum thereafter due to a guidance-
system malfunction. Impact was about 88 miles short and 0.4 miles right of
target.
227. 289D (Mariner-3),5 Nov 64; Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 4: A short second burn
of the Agena prevented attainment of the desired orbit, and resulted in a
heliocentric orbit.
232. 146D., 11 Dec 64, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: Flight was completely
normal through Centaur first bum. During the coast phase, liquid hydrogen
vented through the vent valve caused vehicle instability and tumbling. By second
engine firing, insufficient liquid hydrogen remained at boost-pump· sump to
sustain normal combustion.
236. 172D/ABRES (Beaver's Dam), 21 Jan 65: Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2 and 3:
The Atlas apparently performed normally, except that the sustainer shut down
1.35 seconds early. The OVl"l failed to·separate from the Atlas and thus failed to
put the spacecraft in orbit.
9/10/96 126 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.