Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
the x and z velocity channels. As a result, the missile impacted about 12 miles
short and 0.2 miles right of target.
170. 52F (Tall Tree 4), 23 Mar 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Missile self-
destructed at about 91 seconds for unknown reasons. Impact was near the flight
line about 120 miles downrange.
171. 65E (Black Buck), 24 Apr 63, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier
hydraulic-system pressure was lost at 301 seconds, resulting in loss of vernier-
engine control during the vernier solo phase. The reentry vehicle impact point
was not perceptibly affected by this malfunction.
176. 139D LV-3A/ Agena B (Big Four), 12 Jun 63: Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1:
Flight appeared normal until about 88.4 seconds when, due to a hydraulic failure,
the vehicle made a violent right and down maneuver. The missile broke up five
seconds later at 93.4 seconds.
181. 24E (Silver Doll), 26 July 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Spurious voltage
transients caused premature pressurization of the vernier solo tanks at
101.3 seconds, and premature sustainer engine shut down just after booster
separation at 141 seconds.
187. 63D (Cool Water III), 6 Sep 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: All systems
performed satisfactorily till 110 seconds, when the sustainer/vernier hydraulic
pressure dropped from 3080 to 490 psig. The failure resulted in premature
shutdown of the sustainer engine at 136 seconds. Booster-engine cutoff occurred
normally at 140.3 seconds, and the booster was successfully jettisoned. The
impact point occurred about 620.miles downrange.
188. 84D (Cool Water IV), 11 Sep 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2~5: Flight
seemed normal through SECO, although the pneumatic precharge to the vernier
solo accumulator was lost at 96.6 seconds. Due to this failure, missile stability was
lost near the start of the vernier solo phase. The R/V probably failed to separate.
189. 71E (Filter Tip), 25 Sep 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Visual observers
reported a boat-tail fire, radical oscillations in yaw, and rough running booster
and sustainer engines. Failure of the sustainer hydraulic system during the
staging sequence resulted in loss of missile stability at 140 seconds. Sustainer and
vernier engines shut down at about 267 seconds with the impact point about 600
miles downrange.
190. 45F (Hot Rum), 3 Oct 63, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: The B-1 booster-engine
fuel valve failed to open during the start sequence, so the engine did not ignite.
Missile toppled over and exploded.
9/10/96 125 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.