Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
72 and 73 seconds, and a final explosion occurred at 74 seconds. Impact was
about 8 miles downrange and one mile crossrange.
76. SE, 24 Jan 61, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Missile stability was lost at about
161 seconds, some 30 seconds after BECO, probably due to failure of the servo-
amplifier power supply. The sustainer engine shut down at 248 seconds, and the
vernier engines about 10 seconds later. Impact occurred 1316 miles downrange
and 215 miles crossrange.
77. 70D (LV-3A)/ Agena A (Jawhawk Jamboree), 31 Jan 61, Response Mode NA,
Flight Phase 2: Flight was considered successful although loss of rate lock at 222
seconds caused slightly erratic steering during the last 20 seconds of Atlas
sustainer thrusting flight and failure of vehicle to pitch over during the vernier
solo period.
80. 13E, 13 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer main fuel valve
remained in the full open position throughout flight, resulting in fuel depletion
and premature shutdown of sustainer engine at 251 seconds.
81. 16E, 24 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1.5: Due to depletion of helium-
bottle pressure, booster section failed to jettison, leading to fuel depletion and
impact far short of target.
82. 100D (Mercury 3), 25 Apr 61, Response Mode 3, Flight Phase 1: Flight was
terminated at 40 seconds by RSO when vehicle failed to perform roll and pitch-
over maneuvers, apparently due to failure of the autopilot programmer. The
malfunction was attributed to a plastic coating on the connector pins within the
programmer, causing an open circuit. Major debris impacted about 1800 feet
downrange and 6100 feet crossrange left.
86. 27E (Sure Shot), 7 June 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Apparent combustion
instability caused an explosion and missile destruction 3.86 seconds after liftoff.
87. 17E, 22 June 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Missile destroyed itself at 101.5
seconds due to failure of flight-control system. Pitch rate was about 1.55 times
normal. Just before breakup at 66,000 feet altitude, missile had pitched over
almost 90° due to higher than normal pitch rate, producing excessive heating and
aerodynamic loads. At breakup, flight path was nearly horizontal. Impact was
about 64 miles downrange.
93. 111D(Ranger-1), 23 Aug 61, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 4: The Agena
achieved a normal parking orbit. Flight continued normally until Agena second
bum. During the restart sequence the fuel valve failed to open so only oxygen
was pumped .into the thrust chamber. Apogee of final orbit was only slightly
above the normal circular parking-orbit altitude.
9/10/96 120 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.