Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
38. 20D (Able M, 26 Nov 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Third and fourth
stages and payload broke off about 47 seconds. Atlas flight was normal and
second stage ignited properly after Atlas SECO.
43. 6D (Dual Exhaust), 26 Jan 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase .2 and 2.5: At 175
seconds, as a result of a full-scale positive yaw command generated for five
seconds, the missile stabilized on an erroneous heading. When a range-rate flag
was lost 20 seconds later, the differentiated range-rate data substituted for
measured data corrected the erroneous azimuth by generating a full-scale
negative yaw command. The substituted data resulted in slightly erratic steering
and a premature VECO signal that was not acted upon The verniers were
subsequently cutoff by the backup signal.
45. 29D (Midas I), 26 Feb 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was normal·
until firing of the retro rockets after Atlas separation. An explosion at this time,
probably due to activation of the Agena inadvertent separation destruct system,
destroyed both the Atlas vehicle and the Agena.
46. 42D, 8 Mar 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was considered a
success although failure of the vernier hydraulic system resulted in loss of attitude
control during the vernier solo phase.
47. 51 D, 10 Mar 60, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Due to combustion instability,
an explosion occurred in the Bl chamber before missile movement. Missile was
destroyed at 2.5 seconds after 2-inch motion when main propellants ignited.
48. 48D, 7 Apr 60, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Missile was destroyed in launch
stand during launch attempt, apparently due to combustion instability in the B2
thrust chamber.
50. 23D (Lucky Dragon), 6 May 60, Response Mode 3, Flight Phase 1: An inoperative
pitch gyro caused pitch instability, and resulted in destruct at 25.6 seconds.
54. 62D, 22 June 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier engines were cutoff
by autopilot backup when guidance discrete was not sent. Impact was 18 miles
long.
56. 60D, 2 July 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Depletion of helium bottle
pressure led to low sustainer and vernier engine thrust, and eventually early
shutdown of engines. Impact was 40 miles short of target.
57. 74D (Tiger Skin), 22 July 60, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: A pitchover rate
that was 69% above the nominal rate resulted in vehicle breakup at 69.2 seconds.
9/10/96 118 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.