Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
22. 7C, 18 Mar 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Booster engines shut down
prematurely at 129.4 seconds, but booster section was not jettisoned until the near-
normal time of 153 seconds. Guidance was inoperative. Since the sustainer
engine could not gimbal before booster separation, the autopilot was unable to
stabilize the missile after BECO. The sustainer shut down about 40 seconds before
propellant depletion. The reentry vehicle spin rockets fired prematurely at 86.3
seconds after liftoff.
23. 3D, 14 Apr 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Performance of B2 engine
dropped 36% at launch, resulting in a violent pitch as missile left the launcher.
Flight control system corrected missile attitude, and flight continued at reduced
thrust until a more violent explosion tore the thrust section away from the missile
at 26.1 seconds. The sustainer continued operating with decreased thrust until
shutdown by the safety officer at 36 seconds. Debris impacted about 3000 feet
from launch point.
24. 7D, 18 May 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Failure in pneumatic system
resulted in missile explosion at 65 seconds. A temporary failure of the thrust-
structure fairing at liftoff strained the pneumatic lines and disconnects, resulting
in leaks in the pneumatic system.
25. 5D, 6 June 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Either structural damage at
booster staging or failure of the booster staging valve to dose resulted in a fuel
leak and explosion at 159.3 seconds. Impact occurred near the flight line about
780 miles downrange.
30. 10D (Mercury), 9 Sep 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Booster section failed
to jettison resulting in a final velocity about 3000 ft/sec low and an impact range
about 500 miles short of target.
32. 17D, 16 Sep. 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: :Flight was considered a
success since impact was within two miles of target point. However, failure of the
vernier hydraulic package resulted in loss of missile control during the vernier
solo phase.
35. 26D, 29 Oct 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier solo phase was
unstable in pitch·due to loss of thrust from V2 vernier engine. The V2 engine lost
chamber pressure during booster jettison. Impact was about 14 miles short and
out of splash net.
36. 28D, 4 Nov 59, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2: The flight was normal, but
was terminated prematurely when the range-safety impact-predictor system
failed.
37. 15D, 24 Nov 59, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was normal, except
the reentry vehicle failed to arm or separate.
9/10/96 117 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.