Documents / Report

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

U.S. Department of War · 1996-09-10 · 181 pages · text from the file's own layer

This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.

From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

  • p. 88 …Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely. Destruct is…
  • p. 106 …121 (8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis…
  • p. 111 …Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the attainment of some, or even all, mission objectives. 50…
  • p. 131 …Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon, and primary mission…
  • p. 132 …Although Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a failure. No other data available. 134…
  • p. 133 …A flight-control malfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program…
  • p. 137 …Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control…
  • p. 138 …The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard yaw rate tum throughout and beyond the…
  • p. 139 …of the rate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control…
  • p. 140 caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a result…
  • p. 151 …Attitude control lost during second stage coast period. Third stage spun up, but did not fire…
  • p. 153 …One solid-rocket motor carried to MECO, but mission was still a complete success. 102. SMS…
  • p. 169 …Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up. 104. IHA (65-210), 1…
  • p. 170 …Nominal mission through transtage second burn shutdown. Attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier…
  • p. 171 …However, satellite propulsion system malfunctioned putting satellite in uncontrollable position with no possibility of restoring mission…
  • p. 172 …control until propellant depletion. Trajectory inaccuracies were compensated for during Stage-2 burn, and the mission…
  • p. 180 …Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957…
9. 3B, 19 July 58, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Random failure of yaw rate
gyro caused violent maneuvers resulting in rupture of LO2 tank, engine
shutdown, and a fire near the lube oil drain. Missile broke up about 42 seconds
with impact about 2 miles downrange and 0.4 miles crossrange left.
11. SB, 28 Aug 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Missile was normal to SECO.
After SECO, failure of hydraulic system caused loss of vernier engine control.
Warhead impacted close to intended target.
12. BB, 14 Sep 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Warhead impacted close to
target although control was lost after SECO due to failure of vernier-engine
hydraulic system.
13. 6B, 18 Sep 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Except for a late-opening
sustainer fuel valve, flight was apparently normal until 80.8 seconds, when the Bl .
turbopump failed. Performance of the Bl engine and the axial acceleration
dropped sharply at about 81.7 seconds, and the B2 system shut down about 0.1
seconds later. The sustainer and vernier engines continued to operate normally
until .82.9 seconds, when the missile exploded. Impact was about 25 miles
downrange and about 0.6 miles right of the flight line. •
14. 9B, 17 Nov 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The flight was terminated at
227.6 seconds by premature fuel depletion caused either by failure of the
propulsion utilization system or by a tanking error. Missile impacted near the
flight line about 2300 miles downrange, some 850 miles short of target.
18. 13B, 15 Jan 59, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: The vehicle appeared normal for
the first 50-60 seconds, at which time it was obscured by clouds. It was probably
normal until about 100 seconds, but prelaunch removal of the mainframe
telemetry system prevented a precise determination. Beginning about 101
seconds, various erratic pitch, yaw; and roll rates and oscillations were noted with
accompanying drops in acceleration and velocity. These rates become excessive at
106.6 seconds. At 121 seconds, the nosecone telemetry system showed that yaw
and pitch rates abruptly increased, and this condition existed ·until reentry at 281
seconds. All thrusting apparently stopped between 121 and 123 seconds. The
missile impacted about 170 miles downrange and 7.5 miles left.
19. 4C, 27 Jan 59, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Since the guidance system was
inoperative throughout, the flight path was controlled by the pre-programmed
flight control system. Impact was about 80 miles long and 30 miles left of target
point.
21. SC, 20 Feb 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: After a normal booster phase,
missile exploded at 173 seconds (BECO at 149.2 sec) apparently due to loss of fuel-
tank pressure and subsequent rupture of LOX/ fuel-tank bulkhead. Impact was
about 1000 miles downrange and 6 miles left.
9/10/96 116 RTI

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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.