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Package compiled for FAA managers

FAA via National Archives / The Black Vault · 122 pages · text from the file's own layer

This package was compiled by the FAA Alaskan Region Public Affairs Office in Anchorage and sent to FAA managers with a memo from Paul Steucke dated March 5, 1987. It gathers material on the November 17, 1986 sighting by the crew of Japan Air Lines flight 1628: a news release, pilot and controller transcripts, crew interviews and radar analysis. The FAA concluded that it could not confirm the event. It attributed the second radar target to a split, uncorrelated return from the JAL Boeing 747 and planned no further investigation.

  • p. 3 …Investi gation of Japan Air Lines flight 1628 Sighting of Unidentified Air Traffic on November 17…
  • p. 5 …but •.• JL1628 = Japan Air Lines flight #1628 Rl.5 = Controller positicn, Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control…
  • p. 7 …sixty one line. Approach. Look at your radar. We got a Japan Air one six~ eight…
  • p. 82 …a report concerning the incident to Japan Airlines Flight 1628 (JL1628) north of Fairbanks, Alaska on…
  • p. 107 …86 unidentified object sighting by Japan Air Lines flight 1628. (5 pages) PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN…
Paul Steucke
FAA Public Affairs
701 C Street, Box 14
Anch. AK 99513 ~·1 arch 5 , 1987
UNCORRELATED RADAR SIGNALS
Radar data received by the FAA and used to track Japan Airlines flight 1628
on the night of the November 17, 1986, was retained by FAA. Review of this
radar data by FAA experts using identical equipment at the FAA's research
technical center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, revealed that the radar system
was receiving what is called an "uncorrelated primary and beacon target".
This electronic phenomena is not unusual according to Steucke who said, "It
is unfortunate that the uncorrelated target phenomena occurred just when a
pilot was reporting seeing something outside his aircraft.
The controller's statements, released by the FAA, indicate that they thought
there might be another aircraft or object in the area of the JAL flight.
Steucke said, "The controllers were doing their job right because they have to
work with what is right there in front of them on the screen, especially when
you have a Captain that is reporting "other traffic" in his irmiediate area.
The .. radar data they had was one target, moving slowly across the radar screen.
They don't have the benefit of "monday morning quarterbacking" with multiple
radar images as was the case in regenerating the radar data." Review of the
radar data by FAA experts revealed the "uncorrelated target" phenomena.
FAA electronic technicians explained that an "uncorrelated primary and
beacon target" on the radar screen occurs when the radar energy that is sent up
toward the aircraft, (primary signal) returns to the radar receiver along with
the aircraft transponder (beacon) signal and the two do not match up as being
at the same exact location.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 122 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.