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an attempt to locate various records thought._to have been in the custody of the
deceased.
Even though Air Force research originally started in January, 1994, the first official
Air Force-wide tasking was directed by the March 1, 1994, memorandum from
SAF1AA (Atch 5) and was addressed to those current Air Staff elements that
would be the likely repository for any records, particularly if there was anything
of an extraordinary nature involved. This meant that the search was not limited
to unclassified materials, but also would include records of the highest classifica-
tion and compartmentation.
The specific Air Staff/Secretariat offices queried included the following:
(a) SAF I AAI, Directorate of Information Management
(b) SAF I AQL, Directorate of Electronics and Special Programs
(c) AF /SE, Air Force Safety
(d) AF/HO, Air Force Historian
(e) AF/IN, Air Force Intelligence [including the Air Force Intelligence Agency
(AFIA) and the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC)]
(f) AF /XOW, Directorate of Weather
(g) [added later] The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)
In addition to the above Air Staff and Secretariat offices, SAF I AAZ also reviewed
appropriate classified records for any tie-in to this matter. With regards to highly
classified records, it should be noted that any programs that employ enhanced
security measures or controls are known as a Special Access Programs (SAPs).
The authority for such programs comes from Executive Order 12356 and flows
from the Department of Defense to the Services via DoD Directive 5205.7. These
programs are implemented in the Air Force by Policy Directive 16-7 and Air
Force Instruction 16-701. These directives contain detailed requirements for
controlling and reporting, in a very strict manner, all SAPs. This includes a report
from the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense (and ultimately to
Congress) on all SAPs submitted for approval, and a certification that there are
no "SAP-like" programs being operated. These reporting requirements are
stipulated in public law.
It followed that if the Air Force had recovered some type of extraterrestrial
spacecraft and/or bodies and was exploiting this for scientific and technology
purposes, then such a program would be operated as a Special Access Program
(SAP). SAF I AAZ, the Central Office for all Air Force SAPs, has knowledge of,
and security oversight over, all SAPs. SAF I AAZ categorically stated that no such
SAP or SAPs exist that pertain to extraterrestrial spacecraft/ aliens.
Likewise, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, who head the
Special Program Oversight Committee which oversees all sensitive programs in
the Air Force, had no knowledge of the existence of any such program involving,
or relating to, the events at Roswell or the alleged technology that supposedly
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