Documents / Official release
This is the Fiscal Year 2023 Consolidated Annual Report on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena from the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, dated October 2023. It covers 291 UAP reports that the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) received between 31 August 2022 and 30 April 2023, bringing its total to 801. It found no adverse health effects and no reports attributed to foreign activity. It concludes that most UAP will likely resolve to ordinary phenomena once better data is collected.
UNCLASSIFIED 4 UNCLASSIFIED II. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS Scope This consolidated annual report is provided by DoD and ODNI in response to a requirement established in the NDAA for FY 2022, Section 1683(h), as amended by Section 6802(k) of the FY 2023 NDAA (as codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3373), which states: “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified anomalous phenomena.” This report was drafted by AARO and ODNI’s National Intelligence Manager for Military Integration (NIM-MIL) and coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs; the Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; the Office of the General Counsel of the DoD; the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; ODNI’s NIM- Economic Security and Emerging Technology; ODNI’s National Counterintelligence and Security Center; ODNI’s National Intelligence Council; the Department of Energy; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency; the DoD Joint Staff; the National Ground Intelligence Center; the Missile and Space Intelligence Center; the Office of Naval Intelligence/National Maritime Intelligence Center; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration; the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL); the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC); the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; the U.S. Army; the U.S. Navy (USN); the U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Air Force (USAF); and the U.S. Space Force (USSF). Assumptions The assumptions inherent in this mission set remain the same as outlined in the previous report, which is that a wide range of factors can influence the observation and detection of UAP, observers convey their accurate recollection of their perception of the event, and that sensors generally operate correctly. However, AARO and NIM-MIL recognize that many reports are probably the result of sensor artifacts, equipment error, misidentification, or misperception.01 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C) Date: 1/23/2025
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Official release, from the nara collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 16 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.