Documents / Official release
This 2023 Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing paper from staff in DSO/SOSB asked for approval to update security incident database flyover reporting guidance so it covers Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). It explains that the FY-2023 National Defense Authorization Act requires the NRC to send UAP and drone flyover data to the Pentagon's All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) every year. It notes that the NRC has no guidance for telling UAP apart from drones. It recommends a separate UAP category, guidance for licensees and possible rulemaking.
1 Lead Staff Members: Daryl Johnson, DSO/SOSB 1. Reason for the briefing: ☐Information Meeting ☒Decision/Alignment Meeting ☐Other ________________ 2. Subject of the briefing: Updating flyover reporting guidance for SIDs to include Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon (UAP)and potential impacts to Enhanced Weapons Rule reporting requirements 3. Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF): Provide DSO Director and Deputy Director with an overview of the new reporting requirement regarding UAPs to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and propose recommendations for reporting, collecting, and analyzing UAP data from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees, if any. Key Messages: • There is a new federal law requiring the NRC provide UAP and drone flyover data to the DOD’s All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) on a recurring annual basis (see FY-2023 National Defense Authorization Act). • UAPs differ from identified aircraft (such as fixed-wing, rotary, and UAS) such as having no propulsion, no sound, different flight maneuvers and capabilities, as well as operating in both water and air, among other characteristics. • Currently, there is no security incident database (SID) category or NRC guidance to licensees on how to differentiate between UAS and UAP. This has the potential to under report, confuse, or ignore such sightings/incidents. As a result, we have no idea if UAPs are flying over the aerospace of nuclear power plants or Category I fuel cycle facilities. For example, NRC licensees may mistakenly report a UAP as a UAS/drone instead or not report them at all since there is no mention of UAPs in prior NRC security advisories or guidance. Further, NRC licensees are likely unaware of what constitutes a UAP or their unique physical and anomalous characteristics. • Having no differentiation between UAS and UAP in SID reporting has the potential to impact timely Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) response times related to UAPs/Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) due to staff having to reanalyze UAS related responsive records to see if the licensee is describing an identified UAS or a potential UAP. • Creating a separate category for UAP will create efficiency and avoid issues related to timeliness when responding to FOIA requests.
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Official release, from the nara collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 3 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.