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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-93
MCDIVITT: Oh my God! That’s terrible. You know, he wrote a really great article about
mothering the astronauts after their flights. I’ve got it around here someplace. I don’t even
know what magazine it was in. But a great, great article. A good guy. I’m sorry. Well, go
ahead.
WARD: Well, Brian recalled going to a press conference, and it may’ve been the one that you
were reflecting on, and he said that it was so beneficial in his view that the press had been in
the Control Center when this happened, had been listening to the flight director’s loop,
because he said it allowed one of the participants, and he couldn’t remember which one to
begin his remarks by saying, “Ladies and gentlemen, you know everything we know. The
only thing you don’t know is what we’re going to do about it. And that’s what we’re here to
tell you.” And it, in his view, had a tremendous amount to do with garnering public support
at the time.
MCDIVITT: Yeah, yeah. Well, it was an open program. And you know, sometimes the—
you didn’t want to get the press involved in the decision-making process. You wanted them
to know the decision but not the decision-making process, because everybody wasn’t always
in agreement to start with on what should we do about what you should do. And so, you
know, we had to coalesce this thing and then either—one of the flight directors had to make
the decision or I had to make the decision, depending on whose bailiwick it fell into. But we
had to do that.
I remember one time I had made a decision. It had to do with a hatch. I
don’t remember what it was. And Rocco [Petrone] said, “I just got a phone call from the
White House; and the President wants a memo or something on that.” “Oh my God!” You
know, it was like two or three in the morning. So, I called my secretary up and said, “Suzie,

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