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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-91
WARD: While we’re on the subject of the press, during your tenure as Program Manager
NASA made a couple of very significant decisions with regard to media relations. One of
which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight director’s loop.
That went into effect on Apollo 13. And another management decision, and both of these, I
think, went all the way to [NASA] Headquarters, was to permit the press to hold in-flight
press conferences with crews. What was your reaction to both of those decisions at the time
they went?
MCDIVITT: Well, I supported them. I thought that we should never interfere in any way with
the flight crews on a lunar-landing mission until they were in the command module
transearth flight. And, you know, we didn’t do anything up until that time to distract them
one iota from it. I even had them, you know, they were a lot of really good scientific ideas
going around at NASA.
And I put out a letter to all of NASA Centers, “If you guys can come up with an
experiment that has no interface with the spacecraft other than the 28 bolts and you can write
the directions on how to use this thing on a simple sheet of paper, we’ll carry them, because
we have enough extra weight capacity,”—in those days— “we will carry it in a thing. And if
the crew gets around to it, they can do the experiment on the way home. But no training
involved. None!” Unfortunately, the crews would cheat on me and go train a little bit.
And the same thing applied to the public relations aspect of it. Until they had landed
on the Moon and come back off and their mind was clear of all that stuff, and then on the
way home, I didn’t have any problem with it. And I didn’t have any problem with guys
listening to the flight controller’s loop. I mean, they got it delayed anyway sometimes, and
there’s no—

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