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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-83
the program were—would have easily accepted, this sounds kind of hard but would have
easily accepted a loss of a crew and still continued on with the program because I think when
we all got into it, we expected something like that. It never occurred except for the fire, but I
know I personally expected a lot of failures, maybe losing crews, along the way. And if you
didn’t think that was going to happen, you shouldn’t even have been in the program.
So, it was really unfortunate that we didn’t continue on. I think we could have gained
really great scientific knowledge up through 25. I mean, you look at a face—look at the
picture of the Moon and there’s a few little dots on it. That’s hardly—just think what that
would have looked like if we had two times that many, or even more than two times that
many, which would have been easy to do.
WARD: And so, what you’re saying is that: the public perception today that the Apollo
Program was curtailed at the point it was because Congress cut the funding really isn’t the
total story.
MCDIVITT: No. I don’t think so at all. I think it was a lack of drive on the part of NASA
management and a concern over killing somebody.
WARD: And the damage—
MCDIVITT: It shouldn’t have been a concern, because that should have been a concern the
whole way through.
WARD: So, you think the desire to get on with the Shuttle Program and Space Station were
factors?

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