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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-82
I think that NASA top management just ran out of adrenaline, and they—you know,
NASA’s been accused of this a lot, and I think it’s true, is that they want to get on with
the next program. But I think that there were certain people who got the manned space
program going who were afraid we were going to kill somebody and it would jeopardize the
rest of the program.
Killing somebody on that—in that program was something that was so very
highly likely that we, you know—you had to sort of accept that at the beginning. And to start
worrying about it at the end, I think, was a abdication of your responsibility. And they did
cut it from, you know, it went up to 20. And they cut 19 and 20 out I think it was, at one
time. And then we had an 18 programmed. Then we cut the 18 out. I think a lot of people
would have liked to cut— [Recorder turned off.]
MCDIVITT: The contracted spacecraft on the lunar module went out to 25. The—one of the
conceptual spacecraft went out to 25. The contracted for went out through Apollo 20. And
when we started cutting the programs back, they didn’t cut from 20 back to 17. They cut
either 20 to 19 out at one time, and then later 18. Or we cut 20 out and then 18 and 19. I
don’t remember the order. But we cut two out at one time, and one out at another time to get
us back to where we were. And quite frankly, I think that a lot of people would have just as
soon seen us end the program in the 12, 13, 14 area and not do any of the other ones, because
it was very dangerous.
They didn’t want to lose a spacecraft. They didn’t want lose a crew. And they were
afraid that it would jeopardize the future of the whole space program. But I don’t—I
personally don’t think it would have. I think that a lot of people were—most of the people in

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