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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-78
MCDIVITT: Yeah. I remember sitting down at the Cape with General [Samuel C.] Phillips,
who was the [NASA Headquarters Apollo] Program Director, and somebody else, I don’t
remember who it was, I think it was near the time that we were flying Apollo 10. And the
subject came up that, if we landed Apollo 11 where we thought we were going to land it,
where should we land Apollo 12? Nobody had ever focused on the second landing! And so,
we started talking about that. And we already had this ALSEP [Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiment Package] thing. It was being designed, but it wasn’t really included much in the
Apollo Program. It was sort of being designed over here on the side. And the stuff that was
going to go on the lunar surface and what we were going to do with it was sort of a big
question mark.
And so, as he and I were chatting about that—I was already the Deputy Program
Manager, or whatever we called it, for Lunar Surface Exploration—he said, “You know,
we’d better start figuring out how we’re going to do this stuff and what comes next!” And
so, that’s—we really were sort of getting our wheels ground up, rotating. But up until Apollo
11, the mission was, as the President said, it was to land a man on the Moon and return him
safely to Earth. And that didn’t say anything about science.
WARD: So, it really was impressive the way that whole science program came together.
MCDIVITT: Indeed. Yeah. The scientists really, as a group, were really good guys. And,
you know, they knew what they wanted. Gene Shoemaker headed up most of the geology
stuff, although there were a lot of individual principal investigators. Some of those guys
were a pain in the neck once in a while; but by and large, they were a good group of guys,
trying to get the job done. I remember we had one guy who was very outspoken about the
dust problem on the Moon. How we were going to have 200 or 300 ft of dust. And after we

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