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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-76
WARD: Even though—
MCDIVITT: I had to do that with the accident investigation team on Apollo 13 one time, too.
When we got Apollo 13 back, we’d all been up—not all of us, but almost all of us had been
up for, what? four or five days. And so, I sent everybody home and said we’d reconvene, I
think, on Monday. I think we landed on Saturday or Friday. I don’t remember which.
“Everybody go home and get rested, and we’ll start the accident investigation.” I got a call
from NASA Headquarters in my office just before I left, saying, “Well, we’ve got to
reconvene—we’ve got to convene that accident board right now!” I said, “You guys got to
be out of your minds! You know, some of us haven’t had any sleep for three or four days!”
“Well, we’ve got to do it. You know, politically, we can’t put this thing off. We’ve got to
get on top of it.” And so on. Anyway, I brought the guys back.
And then a few days later, we got this super team that came down that was headed up
by a fellow who was the NASA Center Director at Lewis [Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio], I forget his name now [Bruce T. Lundin]. And they came down and with a bunch of
Center Directors and Air Force Generals and—I was still a Colonel at that time. And so, this
was going to be the big super investigating team. Well, we had our own investigating team
of hundreds of people. And so, I used to have a senior management accident review meeting
once a day. And then the guys led by Don [Donald D.] Arabian were—had a meeting all the
time. And they would get together once a day, and then—and the RCS [Reaction Control
System] guys would talk to the electrical guys, and the electrical guys would talk to the
inertial guidance, and they’d all be at the same meeting.
They’d get up and make a report. Everybody then got caught up to date. And this
Center Director wanted to know if—or told me he was going to have his team sit in on those

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