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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-58
And a lot of things will burn very quickly like that.
WARD: Joe Shea, you alluded to, is the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager at the time.
And Joe ended up, along with his counterpart at North American, receiving a lot of the
criticism for the accident and ultimately being replaced. Do you think that was really
justified?
MCDIVITT: No, not at all. Not at all. No, I think the criticism of both the North American
Program Manager and the NASA Program Manager was totally unjustified. If other people
were so smart, why didn’t they say something? I mean, we had the best engineers that we
could find. We had good crewmembers. We had everybody who knew anything about space
working on this thing. And nobody said anything about it. So, for them to then focus on just
a couple of people and say that they were at fault was, I think, really idiotic and, well,
possibly looking for scapegoats. But it wasn’t warranted.
WARD: There was another countercurrent going amidst all of this. And it was the same kind
of a current that was flowing at the time of the Challenger accident, and that was in the press
corps, where the attitude that prevailed was that: if the press had been a little more vigilant,
since it was so clear to everybody following the accident what the cause was, the press
should have been able to figure this out and alert the world—and NASA—to the fact that
they had a problem.
MCDIVITT: Well, I think that there’s a—I think that the press does some good things. I think
they do a lot of bad things, too. And I tend to deal with the press on an individual basis.
There are some good guys, and there are some bad guys. And that was the way I dealt with

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