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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 1 …the Air Force—I’d never been in an airplane. Never been off the ground. I…
  • p. 3 …Having never been in an airplane and no idea what it was all about, and I…
  • p. 7 …was that the Dyna- soar Program would never fly. The spacecraft was wrong. They were trying…
  • p. 8 …You know, it was a lifting body concept and the landing thing, but it never flew…
  • p. 10 …I wanted you to know that I realize that I should never have threatened you like…
  • p. 14 …As soon as we got selected, we were told that, “No more uniforms.” We were never…
  • p. 19 …T-38s never had much fuel, and you
  • p. 20 …And some—you know, we didn’t have everything available in the spacecraft, so never was…
  • p. 22 …It never existed then. So, there was always disagreement amongst the astronauts about what the relationship…
  • p. 28 …So, there’s always the thought that, well, maybe he was never going to come around…
  • p. 33 …We’d never had a flight longer than 30 hours, or whatever it was, that Gordo…
  • p. 38 …You know, he never got sick flying airplanes and the crazy motions that we did. And…
  • p. 39 …I mean, we would’ve never gotten to the Moon when we did if we’d…
  • p. 40 …He never got involved in the mission, because the one in the Mission Control Center in…
  • p. 43 …Fortunately, we never had to try that! WARD: Do you think the nature of the ejection…
  • p. 45 …And I never did see it again.
  • p. 46 …I never did see it until years and years later, when I started getting all these…
  • p. 49 …So, you never see more than one light, or hardly ever see more than one light…
  • p. 50 …were able to overcome these problems and never get down to where we were on our…
  • p. 54 …and backup crews did except they were never going to fly. So, they helped us test…
  • p. 57 …And some of the North American people maintain to this day that they were never told…
  • p. 59 …And then I never dealt with him again; and finally he got fired. So, I don…
  • p. 64 …We never did find them. You know, we never knew exactly what caused the fire; so…
  • p. 65 …It’s just impossible!” We were never going to get the weight on the lunar module…
  • p. 69 …Throttled the engine up and down through regimes it probably was never throttled at when it…
  • p. 74 …Well, that was never my attitude. That was never my attitude. As a matter of fact…
  • p. 83 …It never occurred except for the fire, but I know I personally expected a lot of…
  • p. 85 …I threw him out of my office and I said, “You are never, ever to come…
  • p. 86 …I ran the Apollo Spacecraft Program I never had a problem with money. We were always…
  • p. 87 …And I’d never played baseball in my life!
  • p. 91 …I thought that we should never interfere in any way with the flight crews on a…
  • p. 94 …And I think that we would’ve never had an Apollo Program if Rocco hadn’t…
  • p. 99 …I never did get my Major’s on my shoulders. He called Ed up, promoted Ed…
  • p. 105 …said who was recommending it but they never said who was opposed to it. So, we…
  • p. 108 …He never second-guessed me. He had a boss. The Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight and…
  • p. 109 …And fortunately, my bosses were such that they never second-guessed what I did. They just…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-57
spacecraft at five psi over atmospheric, which was 20 psi. We had a 100% oxygen
environment. I did the same test on top of the Gemini that they were doing at the time that
the fire occurred. And we did it on every Gemini spacecraft. I think we did it on every
Mercury spacecraft, too.
WARD: Do you think the reason for that, and the reason that it appeared so obvious in 20/20
hindsight but was not really apparent at the time, was that we might have been concentrating
so heavily on the environment we knew was going to be dangerous, i.e., space, and
overlooked the dangers while they were still on the launch pad?
MCDIVITT: Well, this was a—no, I think it was a—I don’t think it was—that was not a
single reason for it. It was a myriad of reasons. First, we were designing a new spacecraft.
We had all kinds of stowage problems in the spacecraft. We had all kinds of things that we
were going to have to carry. We had webbing and netting in there that we knew was a
problem, a fire problem. I talked to Joe [Joseph F.] Shea, the [Apollo] Program Manager,
about it and we knew that that was a problem. And we had plans to change all that stuff out
before this flight. They didn’t quite get to it. And we didn’t have any idea how fast it would
burn.
To this day, nobody knows how the fire started. But we just had a lot of
bad circumstances come together. And some of the North American people maintain to this
day that they were never told that the spacecraft would ever be tested in this configuration. If
they didn’t know it, they were the only people in the whole world that didn’t know it. But,
you know, everybody had their own idea how this was going to work, I guess. But it was one
of those circumstances. You had all this flammable material in there and a 100% oxygen
environment at 20 psi. That’s seven times more oxygen than we have in this room right now.

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