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James A. McDivitt oral history (Doug Ward)

NASA Johnson Space Center · 1999-06-29 · 110 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project transcript of astronaut James A. McDivitt, interviewed by Doug Ward at Elk Lake, Michigan, on 29 June 1999. McDivitt talks about flying F-86s in Korea, test pilot work at Edwards, and his first class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School. He also covers turning down Dyna-soar, joining NASA in 1962 and learning to be an Apollo Program Manager. He describes the Change Board and says decisions were not second-guessed.

  • p. 6 …t a definition of the roles and missions of all the different military services and NASA…
  • p. 29 …control, there was no doubt in my mind what my decision would have been. The Mission…
  • p. 37 …There wasn’t anybody in that Mission Control Center who knew anything about it, so there…
  • p. 40 …Your flight—your Gemini IV mission—was also the first flight where Mission Control was located…
  • p. 61 …But sometimes they just got out of control. WARD: Getting back to the effects of the…
  • p. 68 …We made very few changes to it for the original missions. We made a lot
  • p. 69 …McDivitt 29 June 1999 12-69 of changes to it later on for the longer mission…
  • p. 90 …And nobody was getting this live feed of us possibly losing an Apollo mission. And when…
  • p. 91 …One of which was to allow the reporters in Mission Control with access to the flight…
Johnson Space Center Oral History Project James A. McDivitt
29 June 1999 12-57
spacecraft at five psi over atmospheric, which was 20 psi. We had a 100% oxygen
environment. I did the same test on top of the Gemini that they were doing at the time that
the fire occurred. And we did it on every Gemini spacecraft. I think we did it on every
Mercury spacecraft, too.
WARD: Do you think the reason for that, and the reason that it appeared so obvious in 20/20
hindsight but was not really apparent at the time, was that we might have been concentrating
so heavily on the environment we knew was going to be dangerous, i.e., space, and
overlooked the dangers while they were still on the launch pad?
MCDIVITT: Well, this was a—no, I think it was a—I don’t think it was—that was not a
single reason for it. It was a myriad of reasons. First, we were designing a new spacecraft.
We had all kinds of stowage problems in the spacecraft. We had all kinds of things that we
were going to have to carry. We had webbing and netting in there that we knew was a
problem, a fire problem. I talked to Joe [Joseph F.] Shea, the [Apollo] Program Manager,
about it and we knew that that was a problem. And we had plans to change all that stuff out
before this flight. They didn’t quite get to it. And we didn’t have any idea how fast it would
burn.
To this day, nobody knows how the fire started. But we just had a lot of
bad circumstances come together. And some of the North American people maintain to this
day that they were never told that the spacecraft would ever be tested in this configuration. If
they didn’t know it, they were the only people in the whole world that didn’t know it. But,
you know, everybody had their own idea how this was going to work, I guess. But it was one
of those circumstances. You had all this flammable material in there and a 100% oxygen
environment at 20 psi. That’s seven times more oxygen than we have in this room right now.

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